Scepticism and Wittgenstein's On Certainty

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216208%3A11210%2F10%3A10111335" target="_blank" >RIV/00216208:11210/10:10111335 - isvavai.cz</a>
Výsledek na webu
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DOI - Digital Object Identifier
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Jazyk výsledku
angličtina
Název v původním jazyce
Scepticism and Wittgenstein's On Certainty
Popis výsledku v původním jazyce
This article challenges the orthodox interpretation of Wittgenstein's On Certainty which treats his attitude to scepticism as uniformly negative. Reasons are given for the conclusion that although Wittgenstein thinks that scepticism says nothing, he holds that is shows us something very important. In particular, it shows us what propositions stand fast for us (hinge propositions), and it demonstrate that our attachment to these propositions is not grounded in reason.
Název v anglickém jazyce
Scepticism and Wittgenstein's On Certainty
Popis výsledku anglicky
This article challenges the orthodox interpretation of Wittgenstein's On Certainty which treats his attitude to scepticism as uniformly negative. Reasons are given for the conclusion that although Wittgenstein thinks that scepticism says nothing, he holds that is shows us something very important. In particular, it shows us what propositions stand fast for us (hinge propositions), and it demonstrate that our attachment to these propositions is not grounded in reason.

Rok uplatnění
2010
Kód důvěrnosti údajů
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

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