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Epistemological Consequences of Russell's Departure from the Primitivist Theory of Truth

Identifikátory výsledku

  • Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

    <a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216208%3A11210%2F15%3A10296725" target="_blank" >RIV/00216208:11210/15:10296725 - isvavai.cz</a>

  • Výsledek na webu

  • DOI - Digital Object Identifier

Alternativní jazyky

  • Jazyk výsledku

    angličtina

  • Název v původním jazyce

    Epistemological Consequences of Russell's Departure from the Primitivist Theory of Truth

  • Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

    When Russell set out to develop a logical atomism based on his multiple-relation theory of judgment and correspondence theory of truth, he began to doubt the primitivist view he once adopted from G. E. Moore that truth is a simple and indefinable property of propositions. The primitivist theory of truth has not been understood properly and, as a consequence, Russell's transition from it to the correspondence theory has remained blurred. The primitivist theory, as I shall show, is established by an argument from vicious circularity against any attempt, including the correspondence theory, to define truth. 'The treadmill argument', as it is called in the literature, was widely recognized as being set forth by Frege who also adhered to the primitivist view, but it was not properly discussed in connection to Moore and Russell. First, I shall provide a formal exposition of the argument drawing from the textual evidence from all three authors. A sequential model of propositional knowledge is

  • Název v anglickém jazyce

    Epistemological Consequences of Russell's Departure from the Primitivist Theory of Truth

  • Popis výsledku anglicky

    When Russell set out to develop a logical atomism based on his multiple-relation theory of judgment and correspondence theory of truth, he began to doubt the primitivist view he once adopted from G. E. Moore that truth is a simple and indefinable property of propositions. The primitivist theory of truth has not been understood properly and, as a consequence, Russell's transition from it to the correspondence theory has remained blurred. The primitivist theory, as I shall show, is established by an argument from vicious circularity against any attempt, including the correspondence theory, to define truth. 'The treadmill argument', as it is called in the literature, was widely recognized as being set forth by Frege who also adhered to the primitivist view, but it was not properly discussed in connection to Moore and Russell. First, I shall provide a formal exposition of the argument drawing from the textual evidence from all three authors. A sequential model of propositional knowledge is

Klasifikace

  • Druh

    O - Ostatní výsledky

  • CEP obor

    AA - Filosofie a náboženství

  • OECD FORD obor

Návaznosti výsledku

  • Projekt

  • Návaznosti

    S - Specificky vyzkum na vysokych skolach

Ostatní

  • Rok uplatnění

    2015

  • Kód důvěrnosti údajů

    S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů