How Russell Did Not Abandon Russelian Propositions

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

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Výsledek na webu

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DOI - Digital Object Identifier

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Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

How Russell Did Not Abandon Russelian Propositions

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

Recommending that one treat propositions as incomplete symbols, Russell departed from his earlier theory about propositions in 1910. According to one frequently endorsed interpretation, he maintained that ontological commitments to false propositions asobjective entities cannot be reconciled with the associated theory of propositional unity. I explain that the versions of this interpretation in Sainsbury (1979) and Linsky (1993, 1999) are incorrect from exegetical reasons. The objection they ascribe tolater Russell is based on the so-called 'unity argument'. I also argue against Weiss (1995) and Lebens (2009) who endorse the unity argument independently on exegesis of Russell's texts. In the course of my argument, I outline Russell's primitivist views about unity and truth. I elaborate on his theory of unity and develop a sort of redundancy account of unity which I consider to be a correct answer to the problem of unity inherited from Bradley-Russell dispute.

Název v anglickém jazyce

How Russell Did Not Abandon Russelian Propositions

Popis výsledku anglicky

Recommending that one treat propositions as incomplete symbols, Russell departed from his earlier theory about propositions in 1910. According to one frequently endorsed interpretation, he maintained that ontological commitments to false propositions asobjective entities cannot be reconciled with the associated theory of propositional unity. I explain that the versions of this interpretation in Sainsbury (1979) and Linsky (1993, 1999) are incorrect from exegetical reasons. The objection they ascribe tolater Russell is based on the so-called 'unity argument'. I also argue against Weiss (1995) and Lebens (2009) who endorse the unity argument independently on exegesis of Russell's texts. In the course of my argument, I outline Russell's primitivist views about unity and truth. I elaborate on his theory of unity and develop a sort of redundancy account of unity which I consider to be a correct answer to the problem of unity inherited from Bradley-Russell dispute.

Druh

D - Stať ve sborníku

CEP obor

AA - Filosofie a náboženství

OECD FORD obor

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Projekt

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Návaznosti

S - Specificky vyzkum na vysokych skolach

Rok uplatnění

2015

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název statě ve sborníku

Realismus - Relativismus - Konstruktivismus

ISBN

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ISSN

1022-3398

e-ISSN

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Počet stran výsledku

3

Strana od-do

294-296

Název nakladatele

Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society

Místo vydání

Kirchberg am Wechsel

Místo konání akce

Kirchberg am Wechsel, Rakousko

Datum konání akce

9. 8. 2015

Typ akce podle státní příslušnosti

WRD - Celosvětová akce

Kód UT WoS článku

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