History as the Progress in the (Un)Consciousness of Freedom?
Identifikátory výsledku
Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216208%3A11210%2F19%3A10394400" target="_blank" >RIV/00216208:11210/19:10394400 - isvavai.cz</a>
Výsledek na webu
<a href="https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004409712_014" target="_blank" >https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004409712_014</a>
DOI - Digital Object Identifier
<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/9789004409712_014" target="_blank" >10.1163/9789004409712_014</a>
Alternativní jazyky
Jazyk výsledku
angličtina
Název v původním jazyce
History as the Progress in the (Un)Consciousness of Freedom?
Popis výsledku v původním jazyce
The article deals with the Enlightenment conception of freedom as propounded by Kant and as re-interpreted by Hegel. Although for Kant, the source of normativity is practical reason as embodied in the categorical imperative and good will, Hegel contends that this criterion removes the essence of action from the world into a subjective intention. Against Kant, Hegel emphasizes that in focusing on the subjective side of action, we fail to understand that freedom is always realized in concert with others. In this sense, he emphasizes that there are social conditions that enable or disable free acting, and above all, one's freedom depends on the quantity of the freedom of others: The more there are free people, the more evolved the freedom is. As essennially plural, freedom is conditioned by an institutional framework, the "syntax of objective thought." The author argues that due to this institutional dimension of freedom, the outcome of Hegel's philosophy is paradoxical. It is only as long as man is not free that he needs an explicit consciousness of freedom; once he or she finds himself or herself in a free society, i.e., in a society with institutionally secured basic freedoms, he need not maintain a vigilant sense of freedom.
Název v anglickém jazyce
History as the Progress in the (Un)Consciousness of Freedom?
Popis výsledku anglicky
The article deals with the Enlightenment conception of freedom as propounded by Kant and as re-interpreted by Hegel. Although for Kant, the source of normativity is practical reason as embodied in the categorical imperative and good will, Hegel contends that this criterion removes the essence of action from the world into a subjective intention. Against Kant, Hegel emphasizes that in focusing on the subjective side of action, we fail to understand that freedom is always realized in concert with others. In this sense, he emphasizes that there are social conditions that enable or disable free acting, and above all, one's freedom depends on the quantity of the freedom of others: The more there are free people, the more evolved the freedom is. As essennially plural, freedom is conditioned by an institutional framework, the "syntax of objective thought." The author argues that due to this institutional dimension of freedom, the outcome of Hegel's philosophy is paradoxical. It is only as long as man is not free that he needs an explicit consciousness of freedom; once he or she finds himself or herself in a free society, i.e., in a society with institutionally secured basic freedoms, he need not maintain a vigilant sense of freedom.
Klasifikace
Druh
C - Kapitola v odborné knize
CEP obor
—
OECD FORD obor
60301 - Philosophy, History and Philosophy of science and technology
Návaznosti výsledku
Projekt
<a href="/cs/project/EF16_019%2F0000734" target="_blank" >EF16_019/0000734: Kreativita a adaptabilita jako předpoklad úspěchu Evropy v propojeném světě</a><br>
Návaznosti
P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)<br>I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace
Ostatní
Rok uplatnění
2019
Kód důvěrnosti údajů
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů
Údaje specifické pro druh výsledku
Název knihy nebo sborníku
Concepts of Normativity: Kant or Hegel?
ISBN
978-90-04-40970-5
Počet stran výsledku
20
Strana od-do
196-215
Počet stran knihy
260
Název nakladatele
Brill
Místo vydání
Leiden
Kód UT WoS kapitoly
—