Personal identity and the otherness of one's own body
Identifikátory výsledku
Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216208%3A11210%2F19%3A10400545" target="_blank" >RIV/00216208:11210/19:10400545 - isvavai.cz</a>
Výsledek na webu
<a href="https://verso.is.cuni.cz/pub/verso.fpl?fname=obd_publikace_handle&handle=jTIzGFe3.i" target="_blank" >https://verso.is.cuni.cz/pub/verso.fpl?fname=obd_publikace_handle&handle=jTIzGFe3.i</a>
DOI - Digital Object Identifier
<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11007-019-09465-w" target="_blank" >10.1007/s11007-019-09465-w</a>
Alternativní jazyky
Jazyk výsledku
angličtina
Název v původním jazyce
Personal identity and the otherness of one's own body
Popis výsledku v původním jazyce
Locke claims that a person's identity over time consists in the unity of consciousness, not in the sameness of the body. Similarly, the phenomenological approach refuses to see the criteria of identity as residing in some externally observable bodily features. Nevertheless, it does not accept the idea that personal identity has to consist either in consciousness or in the body. We are self-aware as bodily beings. After providing a brief reassessment of Locke and the post-Lockean discussion, the article draws on phenomenological arguments that show the body as lived, that is, lived as one's own body, but also possibly as "other" or "strange." Against what has been claimed in recent writing, especially in literature on Merleau-Ponty, the author argues that the "mineness" of the body and its "alterity" are not two mutually exclusive features. In the final part of the article, the author suggests that the becoming strange of one's own body may legitimately be considered as a prominent experience of what it means to be a person.
Název v anglickém jazyce
Personal identity and the otherness of one's own body
Popis výsledku anglicky
Locke claims that a person's identity over time consists in the unity of consciousness, not in the sameness of the body. Similarly, the phenomenological approach refuses to see the criteria of identity as residing in some externally observable bodily features. Nevertheless, it does not accept the idea that personal identity has to consist either in consciousness or in the body. We are self-aware as bodily beings. After providing a brief reassessment of Locke and the post-Lockean discussion, the article draws on phenomenological arguments that show the body as lived, that is, lived as one's own body, but also possibly as "other" or "strange." Against what has been claimed in recent writing, especially in literature on Merleau-Ponty, the author argues that the "mineness" of the body and its "alterity" are not two mutually exclusive features. In the final part of the article, the author suggests that the becoming strange of one's own body may legitimately be considered as a prominent experience of what it means to be a person.
Klasifikace
Druh
J<sub>imp</sub> - Článek v periodiku v databázi Web of Science
CEP obor
—
OECD FORD obor
60301 - Philosophy, History and Philosophy of science and technology
Návaznosti výsledku
Projekt
<a href="/cs/project/GA18-16622S" target="_blank" >GA18-16622S: Osobní identita na rozcestí. Fenomenologické, genealogické a hegelovské přístupy</a><br>
Návaznosti
P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)
Ostatní
Rok uplatnění
2019
Kód důvěrnosti údajů
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů
Údaje specifické pro druh výsledku
Název periodika
Continental Philosophy Review
ISSN
1387-2842
e-ISSN
—
Svazek periodika
52
Číslo periodika v rámci svazku
3
Stát vydavatele periodika
NL - Nizozemsko
Počet stran výsledku
13
Strana od-do
265-277
Kód UT WoS článku
000485306600001
EID výsledku v databázi Scopus
2-s2.0-85065141656