Personal Uniqueness and Events

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216208%3A11210%2F21%3A10430597" target="_blank" >RIV/00216208:11210/21:10430597 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://verso.is.cuni.cz/pub/verso.fpl?fname=obd_publikace_handle&handle=Puxa78_BCZ" target="_blank" >https://verso.is.cuni.cz/pub/verso.fpl?fname=obd_publikace_handle&handle=Puxa78_BCZ</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10746-021-09597-0" target="_blank" >10.1007/s10746-021-09597-0</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Personal Uniqueness and Events

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

In contrast to Anglophone debates on personal identity initially formed by John Locke&apos;s investigation of personal identity in the sense of personal continuity or persistence through time, the Continental tradition focuses on what constitutes ipseity (ipséité, Selbstsein, selfhood) in the sense of individuality or uniqueness of the human being &quot;constituted&quot; by its continuous transformation through changing experience. In this study, I claim that contemporary phenomenological research in France-especially the &quot;phenomenology of the event&quot; as represented by Henri Maldiney and Claude Romano-contributes to this Continental discussion in a significant way: it formulates the conditions of personal uniqueness or distinctiveness with regard to other persons, conditions not to be found in Heidegger&apos;s existential conception of selfhood in Being and Time. More precisely, Maldiney and Romano allow us to answer the principal questions of this study: In what does the personal uniqueness consist? What exactly individualizes the first-person selfhood disclosed in Dasein&apos;s relation to death? In my three-stage analysis, I first deal with Heidegger&apos;s conception of selfhood in Being and Time and its limits with respect to the question of personal uniqueness. Next, I analyse Maldiney&apos;s conception of &quot;eventful selfhood&quot; in which he &quot;completes&quot; Heidegger&apos;s conception of selfhood by describing Dasein&apos;s openness to ontical, and yet fully authentic events. Finally, I develop the argumentation by presenting Romano&apos;s even more radical conception of the &quot;happening subjectivity&quot; (advenant), which allows us to return to the second major feature of personal identity: personal persistence. Nonetheless, I conclude that the connection between personal uniqueness and persistence is not sufficiently examined in the phenomenology of the event, which opens the path towards another related inquiry into the following problem: What is the proper subjective dimension or the &quot;underlying thing&quot; (ὑποκείμενον) in the background of personal persistence which somehow resists events?

Název v anglickém jazyce

Personal Uniqueness and Events

Popis výsledku anglicky

In contrast to Anglophone debates on personal identity initially formed by John Locke&apos;s investigation of personal identity in the sense of personal continuity or persistence through time, the Continental tradition focuses on what constitutes ipseity (ipséité, Selbstsein, selfhood) in the sense of individuality or uniqueness of the human being &quot;constituted&quot; by its continuous transformation through changing experience. In this study, I claim that contemporary phenomenological research in France-especially the &quot;phenomenology of the event&quot; as represented by Henri Maldiney and Claude Romano-contributes to this Continental discussion in a significant way: it formulates the conditions of personal uniqueness or distinctiveness with regard to other persons, conditions not to be found in Heidegger&apos;s existential conception of selfhood in Being and Time. More precisely, Maldiney and Romano allow us to answer the principal questions of this study: In what does the personal uniqueness consist? What exactly individualizes the first-person selfhood disclosed in Dasein&apos;s relation to death? In my three-stage analysis, I first deal with Heidegger&apos;s conception of selfhood in Being and Time and its limits with respect to the question of personal uniqueness. Next, I analyse Maldiney&apos;s conception of &quot;eventful selfhood&quot; in which he &quot;completes&quot; Heidegger&apos;s conception of selfhood by describing Dasein&apos;s openness to ontical, and yet fully authentic events. Finally, I develop the argumentation by presenting Romano&apos;s even more radical conception of the &quot;happening subjectivity&quot; (advenant), which allows us to return to the second major feature of personal identity: personal persistence. Nonetheless, I conclude that the connection between personal uniqueness and persistence is not sufficiently examined in the phenomenology of the event, which opens the path towards another related inquiry into the following problem: What is the proper subjective dimension or the &quot;underlying thing&quot; (ὑποκείμενον) in the background of personal persistence which somehow resists events?

Druh

J_imp - Článek v periodiku v databázi Web of Science

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

60301 - Philosophy, History and Philosophy of science and technology

Projekt

<a href="/cs/project/GA18-16622S" target="_blank" >GA18-16622S: Osobní identita na rozcestí. Fenomenologické, genealogické a hegelovské přístupy</a><br>

Návaznosti

P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)

Rok uplatnění

2021

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Human Studies

ISSN

0163-8548

e-ISSN

—

Svazek periodika

44

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

4

Stát vydavatele periodika

NL - Nizozemsko

Počet stran výsledku

20

Strana od-do

721-740

Kód UT WoS článku

000679645200001

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-85111941358