Master, Slave and Wittgenstein: the Dialectic of Rule-Following
Identifikátory výsledku
Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216208%3A11210%2F19%3A10404127" target="_blank" >RIV/00216208:11210/19:10404127 - isvavai.cz</a>
Výsledek na webu
<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/9783110572780-017" target="_blank" >http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/9783110572780-017</a>
DOI - Digital Object Identifier
<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/9783110572780-017" target="_blank" >10.1515/9783110572780-017</a>
Alternativní jazyky
Jazyk výsledku
angličtina
Název v původním jazyce
Master, Slave and Wittgenstein: the Dialectic of Rule-Following
Popis výsledku v původním jazyce
Pace Wittgenstein's saying that he sees differences where Hegel sees identities, I start this chapter by claiming that Hegel's and Wittgenstein's philosophies are, in some important sense, identical or similar to each other. And I suggest that this identity consists in the way Hegel and Wittgenstein develop their concepts of knowledge from more primitive forms of consciousness and bring them to a cautiously optimistic closure based on the sociality of reason, particularly as mirrored in Hegel's master-slave parable and Wittgenstein's private language argument. The basic idea behind my line of thought is to read Hegel's master-slave parable not as a loose reference to the problem of mastering a rule but as a complex epistemological argument concerning the struggle between mere "private" opinions, resulting in the emergence of intersubjective knowledge. According to Wittgenstein's examples, the mastering of a rule arises from the mutual conditioning of the pupil and his teacher in the process of following a rule. What is risked here, I claim, is the certainty of one's private opinion, which, in its aiming at objective knowledge, necessarily becomes fallible.
Název v anglickém jazyce
Master, Slave and Wittgenstein: the Dialectic of Rule-Following
Popis výsledku anglicky
Pace Wittgenstein's saying that he sees differences where Hegel sees identities, I start this chapter by claiming that Hegel's and Wittgenstein's philosophies are, in some important sense, identical or similar to each other. And I suggest that this identity consists in the way Hegel and Wittgenstein develop their concepts of knowledge from more primitive forms of consciousness and bring them to a cautiously optimistic closure based on the sociality of reason, particularly as mirrored in Hegel's master-slave parable and Wittgenstein's private language argument. The basic idea behind my line of thought is to read Hegel's master-slave parable not as a loose reference to the problem of mastering a rule but as a complex epistemological argument concerning the struggle between mere "private" opinions, resulting in the emergence of intersubjective knowledge. According to Wittgenstein's examples, the mastering of a rule arises from the mutual conditioning of the pupil and his teacher in the process of following a rule. What is risked here, I claim, is the certainty of one's private opinion, which, in its aiming at objective knowledge, necessarily becomes fallible.
Klasifikace
Druh
C - Kapitola v odborné knize
CEP obor
—
OECD FORD obor
60301 - Philosophy, History and Philosophy of science and technology
Návaznosti výsledku
Projekt
<a href="/cs/project/EF16_019%2F0000734" target="_blank" >EF16_019/0000734: Kreativita a adaptabilita jako předpoklad úspěchu Evropy v propojeném světě</a><br>
Návaznosti
P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)<br>I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace
Ostatní
Rok uplatnění
2019
Kód důvěrnosti údajů
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů
Údaje specifické pro druh výsledku
Název knihy nebo sborníku
Wittgenstein and Hegel. Reevaluation of Difference
ISBN
978-3-11-057278-0
Počet stran výsledku
16
Strana od-do
227-242
Počet stran knihy
428
Název nakladatele
de Gruyter
Místo vydání
Berlin
Kód UT WoS kapitoly
—