The person as a fragile project : on personhood and practical agency in Husserl

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216208%3A11210%2F21%3A10437773" target="_blank" >RIV/00216208:11210/21:10437773 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

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DOI - Digital Object Identifier

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Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

The person as a fragile project : on personhood and practical agency in Husserl

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

Many theoretical accounts of personhood, both classic and contemporary, regard practical agency as a core feature of what it means to be a person. Husserl is no exception. To take a stance, to express it, to even form one&apos;s whole life and actions according to certain convictions, is at the center of Husserl&apos;s descriptions and characterizations of personhood. In Ideas II, Husserl famously introduces his philosophy of the person by arguing that motivation, not causality, is the basic law that governs the life of the person. Furthermore, he shows that the &quot;personalistic attitude&quot;, which discloses this &quot;spiritual world&quot; (geistige Welt) of motivational coherence (motivationaler Zusammenhang), is a basic, natural, and intrinsically social attitude of our everyday life. What follows from this is an equally basic understanding of normativity that is connected to being a person: while the person is intrinsically linked to the motivational structure of her bodily consciousness, she can also let herself be motivated by critical questioning and critical evaluation of these motivations, i.e., by reason. This crucial capacity to &quot;take a stance&quot;, enriched by the possibility of asking for evidence, for true motivation, leads Husserl directly from his social ontology of the person into ethical considerations.

Název v anglickém jazyce

The person as a fragile project : on personhood and practical agency in Husserl

Popis výsledku anglicky

Many theoretical accounts of personhood, both classic and contemporary, regard practical agency as a core feature of what it means to be a person. Husserl is no exception. To take a stance, to express it, to even form one&apos;s whole life and actions according to certain convictions, is at the center of Husserl&apos;s descriptions and characterizations of personhood. In Ideas II, Husserl famously introduces his philosophy of the person by arguing that motivation, not causality, is the basic law that governs the life of the person. Furthermore, he shows that the &quot;personalistic attitude&quot;, which discloses this &quot;spiritual world&quot; (geistige Welt) of motivational coherence (motivationaler Zusammenhang), is a basic, natural, and intrinsically social attitude of our everyday life. What follows from this is an equally basic understanding of normativity that is connected to being a person: while the person is intrinsically linked to the motivational structure of her bodily consciousness, she can also let herself be motivated by critical questioning and critical evaluation of these motivations, i.e., by reason. This crucial capacity to &quot;take a stance&quot;, enriched by the possibility of asking for evidence, for true motivation, leads Husserl directly from his social ontology of the person into ethical considerations.

Druh

C - Kapitola v odborné knize

CEP obor

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OECD FORD obor

60301 - Philosophy, History and Philosophy of science and technology

Projekt

<a href="/cs/project/GA18-16622S" target="_blank" >GA18-16622S: Osobní identita na rozcestí. Fenomenologické, genealogické a hegelovské přístupy</a><br>

Návaznosti

P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)

Rok uplatnění

2021

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název knihy nebo sborníku

The Husserlian Mind

ISBN

978-0-367-19867-1

Počet stran výsledku

14

Strana od-do

393-406

Počet stran knihy

552

Název nakladatele

Routledge

Místo vydání

Abingdon, Oxon

Kód UT WoS kapitoly

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