Minimal Self and Existential Phenomenology : Sartre vs. Zahavi
Identifikátory výsledku
Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216208%3A11210%2F25%3A10496744" target="_blank" >RIV/00216208:11210/25:10496744 - isvavai.cz</a>
Výsledek na webu
<a href="https://verso.is.cuni.cz/pub/verso.fpl?fname=obd_publikace_handle&handle=s2TK_ipqLf" target="_blank" >https://verso.is.cuni.cz/pub/verso.fpl?fname=obd_publikace_handle&handle=s2TK_ipqLf</a>
DOI - Digital Object Identifier
<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.2143/EPH.9.0.3293694" target="_blank" >10.2143/EPH.9.0.3293694</a>
Alternativní jazyky
Jazyk výsledku
angličtina
Název v původním jazyce
Minimal Self and Existential Phenomenology : Sartre vs. Zahavi
Popis výsledku v původním jazyce
The article explicates the methodological background of Zahavi's notion of minimal self and defends a more balanced approach that would account better for the interaction between minimal and more enriched versions of self. While Zahavi's account relies on a particular interpretation of the phenomenological method, which searches for the "invariant structures" of lived experience and holds a strict distinction between fact and essence, the paper focuses on the reconsideration of this opposition by existential phenomenology (expressed most obviously by Merleau-Ponty). To illustrate the significance of this difference, I will contrast Zahavi's formalistic account of self with Sartre's analysis of pre-reflective consciousness. Sartre's emphasis on pre-reflective consciousness may have a lot in common with Zahavi's criticism of the narrative approaches to the self; however, Sartre's investigation of the constitutive negativity of consciousness culminates in his theory of fundamental act of choosing oneself, which organizes and unifies consciousness. The unity of pre-reflective consciousness is not seen here as a "structure" of experience but as a basic movement of consciousness, which cannot be seen as indifferent to particular events of its being and for which consciousness remains responsible. Something like awareness here becomes possible only along with acquiring some fundamental project and some content of one's own life.
Název v anglickém jazyce
Minimal Self and Existential Phenomenology : Sartre vs. Zahavi
Popis výsledku anglicky
The article explicates the methodological background of Zahavi's notion of minimal self and defends a more balanced approach that would account better for the interaction between minimal and more enriched versions of self. While Zahavi's account relies on a particular interpretation of the phenomenological method, which searches for the "invariant structures" of lived experience and holds a strict distinction between fact and essence, the paper focuses on the reconsideration of this opposition by existential phenomenology (expressed most obviously by Merleau-Ponty). To illustrate the significance of this difference, I will contrast Zahavi's formalistic account of self with Sartre's analysis of pre-reflective consciousness. Sartre's emphasis on pre-reflective consciousness may have a lot in common with Zahavi's criticism of the narrative approaches to the self; however, Sartre's investigation of the constitutive negativity of consciousness culminates in his theory of fundamental act of choosing oneself, which organizes and unifies consciousness. The unity of pre-reflective consciousness is not seen here as a "structure" of experience but as a basic movement of consciousness, which cannot be seen as indifferent to particular events of its being and for which consciousness remains responsible. Something like awareness here becomes possible only along with acquiring some fundamental project and some content of one's own life.
Klasifikace
Druh
J<sub>ost</sub> - Ostatní články v recenzovaných periodicích
CEP obor
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OECD FORD obor
60301 - Philosophy, History and Philosophy of science and technology
Návaznosti výsledku
Projekt
—
Návaznosti
S - Specificky vyzkum na vysokych skolach
Ostatní
Rok uplatnění
2025
Kód důvěrnosti údajů
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů
Údaje specifické pro druh výsledku
Název periodika
Etudes phénoménologiques
ISSN
0773-7912
e-ISSN
2033-656X
Svazek periodika
2025
Číslo periodika v rámci svazku
9
Stát vydavatele periodika
BE - Belgické království
Počet stran výsledku
27
Strana od-do
147-173
Kód UT WoS článku
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EID výsledku v databázi Scopus
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