Freedom as hesitation: Henri Bergson in the light of phenomenological criticism

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216208%3A11210%2F25%3A10499068" target="_blank" >RIV/00216208:11210/25:10499068 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://verso.is.cuni.cz/pub/verso.fpl?fname=obd_publikace_handle&handle=IM5_BOkS6n" target="_blank" >https://verso.is.cuni.cz/pub/verso.fpl?fname=obd_publikace_handle&handle=IM5_BOkS6n</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11007-024-09665-z" target="_blank" >10.1007/s11007-024-09665-z</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Freedom as hesitation: Henri Bergson in the light of phenomenological criticism

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

Bergson&apos;s conception of freedom coincides in certain respects with phenomenological approaches, especially in its emphasis on the inherently temporal character of freedom. Nevertheless, it has repeatedly been subject to criticism in phenomenology. In the first part of the study, the author lists three points of the phenomenological critique of Bergson: a different conception of consciousness, a different confidence in the possibilities of metaphysics, and a different way of working with descriptive distinctions, with Bergson moving quickly from descriptive distinctions to conceptual opposites. Despite these differences, however, Bergson and some phenomenological authors share the conviction that freedom is necessarily temporal, that decision and action are processes that cannot be accelerated or skipped, implying hesitation as an indispensable ingredient. The second part of the study is devoted to the analysis of hesitation in phenomenology (as conceived by Paul Ricoeur) and in Bergson. Through a phenomenological reading of Bergson, it offers a conception of hesitation as creativity that can also enrich phenomenology. The article pays particular attention to the very relevance of hesitation. Is the reason for hesitation cognitive (lack of information), volitional (lack of determination of the will) or other? The author proposes an option that preserves both elements but opens up a different perspective: the reason for the hesitation is that it contains elements of interpretation.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Freedom as hesitation: Henri Bergson in the light of phenomenological criticism

Popis výsledku anglicky

Bergson&apos;s conception of freedom coincides in certain respects with phenomenological approaches, especially in its emphasis on the inherently temporal character of freedom. Nevertheless, it has repeatedly been subject to criticism in phenomenology. In the first part of the study, the author lists three points of the phenomenological critique of Bergson: a different conception of consciousness, a different confidence in the possibilities of metaphysics, and a different way of working with descriptive distinctions, with Bergson moving quickly from descriptive distinctions to conceptual opposites. Despite these differences, however, Bergson and some phenomenological authors share the conviction that freedom is necessarily temporal, that decision and action are processes that cannot be accelerated or skipped, implying hesitation as an indispensable ingredient. The second part of the study is devoted to the analysis of hesitation in phenomenology (as conceived by Paul Ricoeur) and in Bergson. Through a phenomenological reading of Bergson, it offers a conception of hesitation as creativity that can also enrich phenomenology. The article pays particular attention to the very relevance of hesitation. Is the reason for hesitation cognitive (lack of information), volitional (lack of determination of the will) or other? The author proposes an option that preserves both elements but opens up a different perspective: the reason for the hesitation is that it contains elements of interpretation.

Druh

J_imp - Článek v periodiku v databázi Web of Science

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

60301 - Philosophy, History and Philosophy of science and technology

Projekt

—

Návaznosti

I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Rok uplatnění

2025

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Continental Philosophy Review

ISSN

1387-2842

e-ISSN

1573-0611

Svazek periodika

58

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

2

Stát vydavatele periodika

NL - Nizozemsko

Počet stran výsledku

16

Strana od-do

211-226

Kód UT WoS článku

001472165200001

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-105003104630