Discretion and political favoritism: Evidence from two reforms in public procurement
Identifikátory výsledku
Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216208%3A11220%2F24%3A10486080" target="_blank" >RIV/00216208:11220/24:10486080 - isvavai.cz</a>
Výsledek na webu
<a href="https://verso.is.cuni.cz/pub/verso.fpl?fname=obd_publikace_handle&handle=iihHgOsuL5" target="_blank" >https://verso.is.cuni.cz/pub/verso.fpl?fname=obd_publikace_handle&handle=iihHgOsuL5</a>
DOI - Digital Object Identifier
<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/soej.12709" target="_blank" >10.1002/soej.12709</a>
Alternativní jazyky
Jazyk výsledku
angličtina
Název v původním jazyce
Discretion and political favoritism: Evidence from two reforms in public procurement
Popis výsledku v původním jazyce
The misuse of bureaucratic discretion in public procurement risks political favoritism and corruption. Discretionary thresholds regulate this, with lenient rules below and strict oversight above these thresholds. We examine the impact of changes in these thresholds in the Czech Republic in 2012 and 2016 on discretion misuse and market competition, using bunching estimators, regression discontinuity, and comprehensive data on construction contracts, political ties, and firm productivity. Our findings show a concentration of contracts just below thresholds, both pre and post-reforms. Reforms reallocating contract values to new thresholds reveal that limiting discretion lowers final contract prices, indicating increased efficiency. However, when discretion increases, final prices are unaffected. Efficiency gains are not seen in contracts awarded to politically connected firms, suggesting that political favoritism hinders market outcome improvements from stricter regulations.
Název v anglickém jazyce
Discretion and political favoritism: Evidence from two reforms in public procurement
Popis výsledku anglicky
The misuse of bureaucratic discretion in public procurement risks political favoritism and corruption. Discretionary thresholds regulate this, with lenient rules below and strict oversight above these thresholds. We examine the impact of changes in these thresholds in the Czech Republic in 2012 and 2016 on discretion misuse and market competition, using bunching estimators, regression discontinuity, and comprehensive data on construction contracts, political ties, and firm productivity. Our findings show a concentration of contracts just below thresholds, both pre and post-reforms. Reforms reallocating contract values to new thresholds reveal that limiting discretion lowers final contract prices, indicating increased efficiency. However, when discretion increases, final prices are unaffected. Efficiency gains are not seen in contracts awarded to politically connected firms, suggesting that political favoritism hinders market outcome improvements from stricter regulations.
Klasifikace
Druh
J<sub>imp</sub> - Článek v periodiku v databázi Web of Science
CEP obor
—
OECD FORD obor
50201 - Economic Theory
Návaznosti výsledku
Projekt
—
Návaznosti
I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace
Ostatní
Rok uplatnění
2024
Kód důvěrnosti údajů
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů
Údaje specifické pro druh výsledku
Název periodika
Southern Economic Journal
ISSN
0038-4038
e-ISSN
2325-8012
Svazek periodika
2024
Číslo periodika v rámci svazku
June
Stát vydavatele periodika
US - Spojené státy americké
Počet stran výsledku
54
Strana od-do
—
Kód UT WoS článku
001241833500001
EID výsledku v databázi Scopus
2-s2.0-85195604389