Manipulation of procurement contracts: evidence from the introduction of discretionary thresholds

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F67985998%3A_____%2F17%3A00475676" target="_blank" >RIV/67985998:_____/17:00475676 - isvavai.cz</a>

Nalezeny alternativní kódy

RIV/00216208:11640/17:00482079

Výsledek na webu

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/pol.20150511" target="_blank" >http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/pol.20150511</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/pol.20150511" target="_blank" >10.1257/pol.20150511</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Manipulation of procurement contracts: evidence from the introduction of discretionary thresholds

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

We present evidence of how policies that create opportunities to avoid open competition in procurement lead to the manipulation of procurement values. We exploit a policy reform in which public bodies were given the autonomy to preselect potential contractors below newly defined discretionary thresholds. Manipulation is revealed through bunching of procurements just below the thresholds in construction works and services, and to a lesser degree, in goods. Among manipulated contracts, we document a threefold increase in the probability that procurements are allocated to anonymous firms, which can hide their owners. This sorting violates assumptions behind regression-discontinuity designs.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Manipulation of procurement contracts: evidence from the introduction of discretionary thresholds

Popis výsledku anglicky

We present evidence of how policies that create opportunities to avoid open competition in procurement lead to the manipulation of procurement values. We exploit a policy reform in which public bodies were given the autonomy to preselect potential contractors below newly defined discretionary thresholds. Manipulation is revealed through bunching of procurements just below the thresholds in construction works and services, and to a lesser degree, in goods. Among manipulated contracts, we document a threefold increase in the probability that procurements are allocated to anonymous firms, which can hide their owners. This sorting violates assumptions behind regression-discontinuity designs.

Druh

J_imp - Článek v periodiku v databázi Web of Science

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

50202 - Applied Economics, Econometrics

Projekt

<a href="/cs/project/TD020099" target="_blank" >TD020099: Empirické modely manipulace s veřejnými zakázkami: Evidence z České republiky</a><br>

Návaznosti

I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Rok uplatnění

2017

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

American Economic Journal-Economic Policy

ISSN

1945-7731

e-ISSN

—

Svazek periodika

9

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

2

Stát vydavatele periodika

US - Spojené státy americké

Počet stran výsledku

23

Strana od-do

293-315

Kód UT WoS článku

000400280000010

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-85018448388