New Powers and the Distribution of Preferences in Global Trade Governance: From Deadlock and Drift to Fragmentation

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216208%3A11230%2F19%3A10377725" target="_blank" >RIV/00216208:11230/19:10377725 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://verso.is.cuni.cz/pub/verso.fpl?fname=obd_publikace_handle&handle=z_V8arqosW" target="_blank" >https://verso.is.cuni.cz/pub/verso.fpl?fname=obd_publikace_handle&handle=z_V8arqosW</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13563467.2018.1509065" target="_blank" >10.1080/13563467.2018.1509065</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

New Powers and the Distribution of Preferences in Global Trade Governance: From Deadlock and Drift to Fragmentation

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

Existing theories make divergent predictions about the impact of new powers on the global political economy. Some argue that a more even distribution of power will erode international cooperation, while others argue that cooperation can continue with the help of international institutions to overcome collective action problems. We argue that this debate overlooks a critical determinant of the shape of power transitions: the distribution of preferences amongst the major powers. It is primarily in the context of divergent preferences that power transitions are likely to give rise to conflict. Moreover, even where preferences diverge, the gains of cooperation provide a strong incentive to continue to pursue goals through multilateralism. This situation leads to forms of institutional change unanticipated by established theories. These include deadlock in expansive multilateral fora, institutional drift as old rules cannot keep up with the changing political and economic context, and fragmentation as countries seek minilateral solutions that reduce preference diversity. We develop this preference-based, institutional argument by examining the distribution of preferences and institutional change at the World Trade Organization (WTO) and its Doha Round, where the power transition is relatively advanced.

Název v anglickém jazyce

New Powers and the Distribution of Preferences in Global Trade Governance: From Deadlock and Drift to Fragmentation

Popis výsledku anglicky

Existing theories make divergent predictions about the impact of new powers on the global political economy. Some argue that a more even distribution of power will erode international cooperation, while others argue that cooperation can continue with the help of international institutions to overcome collective action problems. We argue that this debate overlooks a critical determinant of the shape of power transitions: the distribution of preferences amongst the major powers. It is primarily in the context of divergent preferences that power transitions are likely to give rise to conflict. Moreover, even where preferences diverge, the gains of cooperation provide a strong incentive to continue to pursue goals through multilateralism. This situation leads to forms of institutional change unanticipated by established theories. These include deadlock in expansive multilateral fora, institutional drift as old rules cannot keep up with the changing political and economic context, and fragmentation as countries seek minilateral solutions that reduce preference diversity. We develop this preference-based, institutional argument by examining the distribution of preferences and institutional change at the World Trade Organization (WTO) and its Doha Round, where the power transition is relatively advanced.

Druh

J_imp - Článek v periodiku v databázi Web of Science

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

50601 - Political science

Projekt

<a href="/cs/project/GA17-10543S" target="_blank" >GA17-10543S: Globální byrokracie: politika obsazování sekretariátů mezinárodních organizací</a><br>

Návaznosti

P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)

Rok uplatnění

2019

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

New Political Economy

ISSN

1356-3467

e-ISSN

—

Svazek periodika

24

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

6

Stát vydavatele periodika

US - Spojené státy americké

Počet stran výsledku

24

Strana od-do

735-758

Kód UT WoS článku

000486315500001

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-85051803373