Contested multilateralism as credible signaling: how strategic inconsistency can induce cooperation among states

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216208%3A11230%2F21%3A10417351" target="_blank" >RIV/00216208:11230/21:10417351 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://verso.is.cuni.cz/pub/verso.fpl?fname=obd_publikace_handle&handle=KCNeVJoniF" target="_blank" >https://verso.is.cuni.cz/pub/verso.fpl?fname=obd_publikace_handle&handle=KCNeVJoniF</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11558-020-09398-7" target="_blank" >10.1007/s11558-020-09398-7</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Contested multilateralism as credible signaling: how strategic inconsistency can induce cooperation among states

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

This paper analyzes how patterns of international cooperation are affected if a group of states, led by a major power, pursues a strategy of &quot;contested multilateralism&quot; (CM). We conceptualize CM as a reaction to deadlock in institutional adjustment bargaining where CM lowers the gains actors can reap from cooperation in the short run. We demonstrate that, in the long run, CM nevertheless can have positive effects on international cooperation and specify when this is the case. Because of the costs associated with it, CM conveys a credible signal of the resolve of a dissatisfied group of states to contest the institutional status quo. Due to this capacity, CM alters the institutional and strategic environment within which institutional adjustment bargaining takes place. As a result, CM opens up the possibility for inter-institutional accommodation that increases realized cooperation gains. We probe the plausibility of our theoretical reasoning with empirical case studies on competitive regime creation in multilateral development finance and on regime-shifting in the governance of international trade in genetically modified organisms.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Contested multilateralism as credible signaling: how strategic inconsistency can induce cooperation among states

Popis výsledku anglicky

This paper analyzes how patterns of international cooperation are affected if a group of states, led by a major power, pursues a strategy of &quot;contested multilateralism&quot; (CM). We conceptualize CM as a reaction to deadlock in institutional adjustment bargaining where CM lowers the gains actors can reap from cooperation in the short run. We demonstrate that, in the long run, CM nevertheless can have positive effects on international cooperation and specify when this is the case. Because of the costs associated with it, CM conveys a credible signal of the resolve of a dissatisfied group of states to contest the institutional status quo. Due to this capacity, CM alters the institutional and strategic environment within which institutional adjustment bargaining takes place. As a result, CM opens up the possibility for inter-institutional accommodation that increases realized cooperation gains. We probe the plausibility of our theoretical reasoning with empirical case studies on competitive regime creation in multilateral development finance and on regime-shifting in the governance of international trade in genetically modified organisms.

Druh

J_imp - Článek v periodiku v databázi Web of Science

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

50601 - Political science

Projekt

—

Návaznosti

I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Rok uplatnění

2021

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Review of International Organizations

ISSN

1559-7431

e-ISSN

—

Svazek periodika

16

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

4

Stát vydavatele periodika

US - Spojené státy americké

Počet stran výsledku

28

Strana od-do

843-870

Kód UT WoS článku

000567761300001

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-85090797186