Fiscal sovereignty under EU crisis management: a comparison of Greece and Hungary

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216208%3A11230%2F19%3A10409757" target="_blank" >RIV/00216208:11230/19:10409757 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://verso.is.cuni.cz/pub/verso.fpl?fname=obd_publikace_handle&handle=z4YvBtK-OV" target="_blank" >https://verso.is.cuni.cz/pub/verso.fpl?fname=obd_publikace_handle&handle=z4YvBtK-OV</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1556/032.2019.69.4.6" target="_blank" >10.1556/032.2019.69.4.6</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Fiscal sovereignty under EU crisis management: a comparison of Greece and Hungary

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

This article concerns the changing conditions of fiscal sovereignty within the Eurozone in the context of the evolution of the EU&apos;s institutional crisis-management framework during the recent financial crisis. It begins with a method-of-difference approach to compare the dynamics and outcomes of the crisis in the Greek and Hungarian economies, on the basis of their similarly troubled fiscal positions and domestic political environments. On this basis, an argument is made that the outcomes in Greece (i.e. a breakdown in national fiscal sovereignty and severe economic losses) were not an inevitable product of the economic fundamentals, but at least partially attributable to uncertainty about the extent and expedience of financial assistance through the Eurozone&apos;s crises management institutions. The European Central Bank&apos;s (ECB) 2012 declaration of &quot;unlimited support&quot; for Eurozone governments has done much to calm markets, but has also created an institution with an ambiguous and self-imposed &quot;dual-mandate&quot;. This article concludes that the precedent established by the last crisis has created a fraught situation, leaving the Eurozone without viable options that are both economically efficacious and politically legitimate. Relying on either the ECB or the European Stability Mechanism to manage any future crisis could well provoke a backlash among the Eurozone member states as national fiscal sovereignty is eclipsed by ever-deeper ad hoc financial commitments on the part of the institutions of crisis management.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Fiscal sovereignty under EU crisis management: a comparison of Greece and Hungary

Popis výsledku anglicky

This article concerns the changing conditions of fiscal sovereignty within the Eurozone in the context of the evolution of the EU&apos;s institutional crisis-management framework during the recent financial crisis. It begins with a method-of-difference approach to compare the dynamics and outcomes of the crisis in the Greek and Hungarian economies, on the basis of their similarly troubled fiscal positions and domestic political environments. On this basis, an argument is made that the outcomes in Greece (i.e. a breakdown in national fiscal sovereignty and severe economic losses) were not an inevitable product of the economic fundamentals, but at least partially attributable to uncertainty about the extent and expedience of financial assistance through the Eurozone&apos;s crises management institutions. The European Central Bank&apos;s (ECB) 2012 declaration of &quot;unlimited support&quot; for Eurozone governments has done much to calm markets, but has also created an institution with an ambiguous and self-imposed &quot;dual-mandate&quot;. This article concludes that the precedent established by the last crisis has created a fraught situation, leaving the Eurozone without viable options that are both economically efficacious and politically legitimate. Relying on either the ECB or the European Stability Mechanism to manage any future crisis could well provoke a backlash among the Eurozone member states as national fiscal sovereignty is eclipsed by ever-deeper ad hoc financial commitments on the part of the institutions of crisis management.

Druh

J_imp - Článek v periodiku v databázi Web of Science

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

50601 - Political science

Projekt

—

Návaznosti

I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Rok uplatnění

2019

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Acta Oeconomica

ISSN

0001-6373

e-ISSN

—

Svazek periodika

69

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

4

Stát vydavatele periodika

HU - Maďarsko

Počet stran výsledku

30

Strana od-do

595-624

Kód UT WoS článku

000514815600006

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-85081347012