Financial impact of regulatory sanctions on listed companies

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216208%3A11230%2F20%3A10409760" target="_blank" >RIV/00216208:11230/20:10409760 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://verso.is.cuni.cz/pub/verso.fpl?fname=obd_publikace_handle&handle=QEZ4G.a9Mb" target="_blank" >https://verso.is.cuni.cz/pub/verso.fpl?fname=obd_publikace_handle&handle=QEZ4G.a9Mb</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10657-019-09638-1" target="_blank" >10.1007/s10657-019-09638-1</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Financial impact of regulatory sanctions on listed companies

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

We examine the impact of the enforcement of financial regulations by the French Financial Market Authority on sanctioned firms. The early stages of the enforcement process are by law confidential, with an internal investigation and bilateral exchanges between the defendant and its regulator. The public hearing by the Enforcement Committee leads to a single publication of the decision, being the only public communication. Using an event study methodology, we find that the confidentiality of the initial steps of enforcement procedures is respected and that markets account for the publication of sanctions. Still, reactions are limited in absolute and relative terms, both compared to past studies and in terms of reputational penalty. Some parameters trigger a stronger reaction, but not the most straightforward (such as the cash fine or behavioral sanction). The results echo the reputation for leniency of sanctions (scarce procedures, lax verdicts, low fines, ending neglected by analysts and investors), despite consecutive regulatory tightenings and long procedures. They question the efficiency of enforcement.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Financial impact of regulatory sanctions on listed companies

Popis výsledku anglicky

We examine the impact of the enforcement of financial regulations by the French Financial Market Authority on sanctioned firms. The early stages of the enforcement process are by law confidential, with an internal investigation and bilateral exchanges between the defendant and its regulator. The public hearing by the Enforcement Committee leads to a single publication of the decision, being the only public communication. Using an event study methodology, we find that the confidentiality of the initial steps of enforcement procedures is respected and that markets account for the publication of sanctions. Still, reactions are limited in absolute and relative terms, both compared to past studies and in terms of reputational penalty. Some parameters trigger a stronger reaction, but not the most straightforward (such as the cash fine or behavioral sanction). The results echo the reputation for leniency of sanctions (scarce procedures, lax verdicts, low fines, ending neglected by analysts and investors), despite consecutive regulatory tightenings and long procedures. They question the efficiency of enforcement.

Druh

J_imp - Článek v periodiku v databázi Web of Science

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

50201 - Economic Theory

Projekt

—

Návaznosti

S - Specificky vyzkum na vysokych skolach

Rok uplatnění

2020

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

European Journal of Law and Economics

ISSN

0929-1261

e-ISSN

—

Svazek periodika

49

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

2

Stát vydavatele periodika

NL - Nizozemsko

Počet stran výsledku

37

Strana od-do

301-337

Kód UT WoS článku

000516930600001

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-85080862172