Russia's Failed Nuclear Coercion Against Ukraine
Identifikátory výsledku
Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216208%3A11230%2F23%3A10471898" target="_blank" >RIV/00216208:11230/23:10471898 - isvavai.cz</a>
Výsledek na webu
<a href="https://verso.is.cuni.cz/pub/verso.fpl?fname=obd_publikace_handle&handle=Vtu-oiHp4V" target="_blank" >https://verso.is.cuni.cz/pub/verso.fpl?fname=obd_publikace_handle&handle=Vtu-oiHp4V</a>
DOI - Digital Object Identifier
<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2023.2259665" target="_blank" >10.1080/0163660X.2023.2259665</a>
Alternativní jazyky
Jazyk výsledku
angličtina
Název v původním jazyce
Russia's Failed Nuclear Coercion Against Ukraine
Popis výsledku v původním jazyce
Available scholarship suggests that successful nuclear coercion against resolved adversaries is difficult and, hence, rare. However, Russia appears to have attempted it: When annexing four Ukrainian provinces in autumn 2022, Moscow employed nuclear rhetoric to either force Kyiv into submission or, at a minimum, to limit the Ukrainian forces' freedom of action. Why did the Russian government think it could succeed? Absent access to governmental decision-making documents, our efforts focus on exploiting the existent literature on nuclear coercion, on leveraging our close monitoring of Russia's nuclear rhetoric to conduct congruence analysis, and on extrapolating from various literatures towards theory building. First, we discuss why researchers conclude nuclear coercion is hard. Second, we offer a careful reconstruction of Russia's behaviour. Finally, we propose three potentially complementary pathways that arguably contributed to Moscow's choice to attempt nuclear coercion: overestimating the utility of nuclear weapons; misjudgement of Western stakes; and misunderstanding of global implications.
Název v anglickém jazyce
Russia's Failed Nuclear Coercion Against Ukraine
Popis výsledku anglicky
Available scholarship suggests that successful nuclear coercion against resolved adversaries is difficult and, hence, rare. However, Russia appears to have attempted it: When annexing four Ukrainian provinces in autumn 2022, Moscow employed nuclear rhetoric to either force Kyiv into submission or, at a minimum, to limit the Ukrainian forces' freedom of action. Why did the Russian government think it could succeed? Absent access to governmental decision-making documents, our efforts focus on exploiting the existent literature on nuclear coercion, on leveraging our close monitoring of Russia's nuclear rhetoric to conduct congruence analysis, and on extrapolating from various literatures towards theory building. First, we discuss why researchers conclude nuclear coercion is hard. Second, we offer a careful reconstruction of Russia's behaviour. Finally, we propose three potentially complementary pathways that arguably contributed to Moscow's choice to attempt nuclear coercion: overestimating the utility of nuclear weapons; misjudgement of Western stakes; and misunderstanding of global implications.
Klasifikace
Druh
J<sub>imp</sub> - Článek v periodiku v databázi Web of Science
CEP obor
—
OECD FORD obor
50601 - Political science
Návaznosti výsledku
Projekt
—
Návaznosti
I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace
Ostatní
Rok uplatnění
2023
Kód důvěrnosti údajů
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů
Údaje specifické pro druh výsledku
Název periodika
The Washington Quarterly
ISSN
0163-660X
e-ISSN
1530-9177
Svazek periodika
46
Číslo periodika v rámci svazku
3
Stát vydavatele periodika
US - Spojené státy americké
Počet stran výsledku
18
Strana od-do
167-184
Kód UT WoS článku
001086034900009
EID výsledku v databázi Scopus
2-s2.0-85174168265