Unpacking Russia's Cyber-Incident Response

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216208%3A11230%2F24%3A10486004" target="_blank" >RIV/00216208:11230/24:10486004 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://verso.is.cuni.cz/pub/verso.fpl?fname=obd_publikace_handle&handle=.frhGMfBpL" target="_blank" >https://verso.is.cuni.cz/pub/verso.fpl?fname=obd_publikace_handle&handle=.frhGMfBpL</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2024.2391757" target="_blank" >10.1080/09636412.2024.2391757</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Unpacking Russia's Cyber-Incident Response

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

Western states are increasingly holding foreign governments accountable for cyberattacks. They couple public attribution of cyberattacks (PAC) with indictments, sanctions, and collective &quot;naming and shaming&quot; campaigns. Russia, however, while routinely subject to foreign cyber-intrusions, has seemed much less responsive toward these attacks. I argue that Russia&apos;s restraint regarding PAC stems from its desire to maintain the relative impunity of state-sponsored cyberattacks. This strategy stems from Moscow&apos;s technological inferiority to the West and from the strategic benefits of internationally tolerated cybercrime. Despite the harm to Russia, tolerance toward cybercrime helps the Kremlin steal foreign technology, improve its defensive and offensive cyber capabilities, and facilitate covert action against democracies abroad. Merging securitization theory with criminology, I propose a novel theoretical lens to explain this phenomenon and then test it-quantitatively and qualitatively-against a large dataset of Russian-language media reports, forensic investigations, and policy documents. I argue that threat perception of cyberattacks is not a given but rather is contingent upon the material distribution of cyberpower among nations and intrinsic utility of cybercrime as a political tool.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Unpacking Russia's Cyber-Incident Response

Popis výsledku anglicky

Western states are increasingly holding foreign governments accountable for cyberattacks. They couple public attribution of cyberattacks (PAC) with indictments, sanctions, and collective &quot;naming and shaming&quot; campaigns. Russia, however, while routinely subject to foreign cyber-intrusions, has seemed much less responsive toward these attacks. I argue that Russia&apos;s restraint regarding PAC stems from its desire to maintain the relative impunity of state-sponsored cyberattacks. This strategy stems from Moscow&apos;s technological inferiority to the West and from the strategic benefits of internationally tolerated cybercrime. Despite the harm to Russia, tolerance toward cybercrime helps the Kremlin steal foreign technology, improve its defensive and offensive cyber capabilities, and facilitate covert action against democracies abroad. Merging securitization theory with criminology, I propose a novel theoretical lens to explain this phenomenon and then test it-quantitatively and qualitatively-against a large dataset of Russian-language media reports, forensic investigations, and policy documents. I argue that threat perception of cyberattacks is not a given but rather is contingent upon the material distribution of cyberpower among nations and intrinsic utility of cybercrime as a political tool.

Druh

J_imp - Článek v periodiku v databázi Web of Science

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

50601 - Political science

Projekt

—

Návaznosti

S - Specificky vyzkum na vysokych skolach

Rok uplatnění

2024

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Security Studies

ISSN

0963-6412

e-ISSN

1556-1852

Svazek periodika

33

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

4

Stát vydavatele periodika

GB - Spojené království Velké Británie a Severního Irska

Počet stran výsledku

30

Strana od-do

640-669

Kód UT WoS článku

001371134800001

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-85216780511