The pedagogy of Cyber-WAR: Explaining Ukraine's resilience against Russian Cyber-aggression
Identifikátory výsledku
Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216208%3A11230%2F24%3A10486007" target="_blank" >RIV/00216208:11230/24:10486007 - isvavai.cz</a>
Výsledek na webu
<a href="https://verso.is.cuni.cz/pub/verso.fpl?fname=obd_publikace_handle&handle=BHu9uKo-RT" target="_blank" >https://verso.is.cuni.cz/pub/verso.fpl?fname=obd_publikace_handle&handle=BHu9uKo-RT</a>
DOI - Digital Object Identifier
<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14751798.2024.2326313" target="_blank" >10.1080/14751798.2024.2326313</a>
Alternativní jazyky
Jazyk výsledku
angličtina
Název v původním jazyce
The pedagogy of Cyber-WAR: Explaining Ukraine's resilience against Russian Cyber-aggression
Popis výsledku v původním jazyce
After Russia's massive Cyber-attacks on Ukraine's government and bank sectors in January-February 2022, many analysts alleged that Cyber-power would be a crucial component of Russia's military victory in Ukraine. Contrary to these expectations, however, Russian Cyber-intrusions yielded meagre strategic benefits, with Moscow seemingly prioritising conventional warfare and destruction of energy and civilian infrastructure instead. Using a theory of asymmetric conflict, this paper argues, somewhat counterintuitively, that the reason behind inhibited efficacy of Russian Cyber-operations post-2022 are Moscow's prior Cyber-attacks against Ukraine since 2013. While having helped the Kremlin weaken Ukraine's Cyber-networks and collect local intelligence, these antecedent Cyber-operations have provided a two-pronged learning loop: for Ukraine to cultivate habits of mitigating Russian Cyber-threats, and for Russia to acquire habits of relying on information operations more than on destructive Cyber-attacks. This "pedagogical" mechanism ultimately enabled Ukraine to redress its Cyber-asymmetry with Russia and deny Moscow success in its Cyber-intrusions post-2022.
Název v anglickém jazyce
The pedagogy of Cyber-WAR: Explaining Ukraine's resilience against Russian Cyber-aggression
Popis výsledku anglicky
After Russia's massive Cyber-attacks on Ukraine's government and bank sectors in January-February 2022, many analysts alleged that Cyber-power would be a crucial component of Russia's military victory in Ukraine. Contrary to these expectations, however, Russian Cyber-intrusions yielded meagre strategic benefits, with Moscow seemingly prioritising conventional warfare and destruction of energy and civilian infrastructure instead. Using a theory of asymmetric conflict, this paper argues, somewhat counterintuitively, that the reason behind inhibited efficacy of Russian Cyber-operations post-2022 are Moscow's prior Cyber-attacks against Ukraine since 2013. While having helped the Kremlin weaken Ukraine's Cyber-networks and collect local intelligence, these antecedent Cyber-operations have provided a two-pronged learning loop: for Ukraine to cultivate habits of mitigating Russian Cyber-threats, and for Russia to acquire habits of relying on information operations more than on destructive Cyber-attacks. This "pedagogical" mechanism ultimately enabled Ukraine to redress its Cyber-asymmetry with Russia and deny Moscow success in its Cyber-intrusions post-2022.
Klasifikace
Druh
J<sub>imp</sub> - Článek v periodiku v databázi Web of Science
CEP obor
—
OECD FORD obor
50601 - Political science
Návaznosti výsledku
Projekt
—
Návaznosti
S - Specificky vyzkum na vysokych skolach
Ostatní
Rok uplatnění
2024
Kód důvěrnosti údajů
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů
Údaje specifické pro druh výsledku
Název periodika
Defense and Security Analysis
ISSN
1475-1798
e-ISSN
1475-1801
Svazek periodika
40
Číslo periodika v rámci svazku
2
Stát vydavatele periodika
GB - Spojené království Velké Británie a Severního Irska
Počet stran výsledku
22
Strana od-do
270-291
Kód UT WoS článku
001196841300001
EID výsledku v databázi Scopus
2-s2.0-85189526603