Life and the Reduction to the Life-world
Identifikátory výsledku
Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216208%3A11240%2F17%3A10368233" target="_blank" >RIV/00216208:11240/17:10368233 - isvavai.cz</a>
Výsledek na webu
<a href="https://docs.google.com/viewerng/viewer?url=http://horizon.spb.ru/images/downloads/review/pdf/2017/2/Horizon-6-2+2017-%2BMENSCH.PDF" target="_blank" >https://docs.google.com/viewerng/viewer?url=http://horizon.spb.ru/images/downloads/review/pdf/2017/2/Horizon-6-2+2017-%2BMENSCH.PDF</a>
DOI - Digital Object Identifier
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Alternativní jazyky
Jazyk výsledku
angličtina
Název v původním jazyce
Life and the Reduction to the Life-world
Popis výsledku v původním jazyce
Husserl's Crisis contains his final attempt to understand the world in terms of an ultimately constituting consciousness. The path he chooses is that of a reduction to the "life-world," the world that appears when we bracket the results of the objective sciences. His claim is that "the 'objective' a priori [of the natural sciences] is grounded in the 'subjective-relative' a priori of the lifeworld". It is from the latter that he attempts to achieve his vision of "a universal, ultimately functioning subjectivity". In this article, I question whether this is possible. If the world were the product of this functioning subjectivity, the latter could not be part of the world. But, the inherent sense of the reduction to the life-world leaves us with the sensuous embodied subject, who is a part of the world. How can we think of the a priori in terms of this subject? I conclude by considering both Merleau-Ponty's and Patoč ka's attempts to conceive of such an a priori.
Název v anglickém jazyce
Life and the Reduction to the Life-world
Popis výsledku anglicky
Husserl's Crisis contains his final attempt to understand the world in terms of an ultimately constituting consciousness. The path he chooses is that of a reduction to the "life-world," the world that appears when we bracket the results of the objective sciences. His claim is that "the 'objective' a priori [of the natural sciences] is grounded in the 'subjective-relative' a priori of the lifeworld". It is from the latter that he attempts to achieve his vision of "a universal, ultimately functioning subjectivity". In this article, I question whether this is possible. If the world were the product of this functioning subjectivity, the latter could not be part of the world. But, the inherent sense of the reduction to the life-world leaves us with the sensuous embodied subject, who is a part of the world. How can we think of the a priori in terms of this subject? I conclude by considering both Merleau-Ponty's and Patoč ka's attempts to conceive of such an a priori.
Klasifikace
Druh
J<sub>SC</sub> - Článek v periodiku v databázi SCOPUS
CEP obor
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OECD FORD obor
60301 - Philosophy, History and Philosophy of science and technology
Návaznosti výsledku
Projekt
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Návaznosti
I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace
Ostatní
Rok uplatnění
2017
Kód důvěrnosti údajů
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů
Údaje specifické pro druh výsledku
Název periodika
Horizon. Studies in Phenomenology
ISSN
2226-5260
e-ISSN
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Svazek periodika
6
Číslo periodika v rámci svazku
2
Stát vydavatele periodika
RU - Ruská federace
Počet stran výsledku
17
Strana od-do
13-29
Kód UT WoS článku
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EID výsledku v databázi Scopus
2-s2.0-85047794012