Temporality and embodied self-presence
Identifikátory výsledku
Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216208%3A11240%2F20%3A10417245" target="_blank" >RIV/00216208:11240/20:10417245 - isvavai.cz</a>
Výsledek na webu
<a href="https://verso.is.cuni.cz/pub/verso.fpl?fname=obd_publikace_handle&handle=zMG-vFhcI1" target="_blank" >https://verso.is.cuni.cz/pub/verso.fpl?fname=obd_publikace_handle&handle=zMG-vFhcI1</a>
DOI - Digital Object Identifier
<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11007-020-09494-w" target="_blank" >10.1007/s11007-020-09494-w</a>
Alternativní jazyky
Jazyk výsledku
angličtina
Název v původním jazyce
Temporality and embodied self-presence
Popis výsledku v původním jazyce
As Merleau-Ponty points out, our sense of time is that of passage. This demands that we think of time both as extended-that is, as including the past and the future-and as now, the latter being conceived as the point of expiration. The difficulty comes when try to think these separately. To consider time as extended is to think of it in terms of space-i.e., in terms of the "parts outside of parts" definitive of space. The simultaneous existence of such parts seems to exclude expiration. When, however, we consider time in terms of expiration, we face the problem of when the now expires. It cannot cease to exist in itself, since then it existed. It also cannot cease in another now, since then it did not exist. Such difficulties indicate that something is missing-something presupposed by both, which would allow us to think of expiration and temporal extension together. In this article, I argue that what is missing is the body. Its self-presence is behind these two aspects of time.
Název v anglickém jazyce
Temporality and embodied self-presence
Popis výsledku anglicky
As Merleau-Ponty points out, our sense of time is that of passage. This demands that we think of time both as extended-that is, as including the past and the future-and as now, the latter being conceived as the point of expiration. The difficulty comes when try to think these separately. To consider time as extended is to think of it in terms of space-i.e., in terms of the "parts outside of parts" definitive of space. The simultaneous existence of such parts seems to exclude expiration. When, however, we consider time in terms of expiration, we face the problem of when the now expires. It cannot cease to exist in itself, since then it existed. It also cannot cease in another now, since then it did not exist. Such difficulties indicate that something is missing-something presupposed by both, which would allow us to think of expiration and temporal extension together. In this article, I argue that what is missing is the body. Its self-presence is behind these two aspects of time.
Klasifikace
Druh
J<sub>imp</sub> - Článek v periodiku v databázi Web of Science
CEP obor
—
OECD FORD obor
60301 - Philosophy, History and Philosophy of science and technology
Návaznosti výsledku
Projekt
—
Návaznosti
I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace
Ostatní
Rok uplatnění
2020
Kód důvěrnosti údajů
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů
Údaje specifické pro druh výsledku
Název periodika
Continental Philosophy Review
ISSN
1387-2842
e-ISSN
—
Svazek periodika
53
Číslo periodika v rámci svazku
2
Stát vydavatele periodika
NL - Nizozemsko
Počet stran výsledku
13
Strana od-do
183-195
Kód UT WoS článku
000546931700004
EID výsledku v databázi Scopus
—