The Nοῦς-Body Relationship in Aristotle's De Anima

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216208%3A11210%2F21%3A10438401" target="_blank" >RIV/00216208:11210/21:10438401 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003008484-14" target="_blank" >https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003008484-14</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003008484-14" target="_blank" >10.4324/9781003008484-14</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

The Nοῦς-Body Relationship in Aristotle's De Anima

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

Since antiquity interpreters have disagreed as to whether νοῦς (intellect) according to Aristotle is separable from the body or is rather, as a part of the form of the body, inseparable from it by its very definition. I argue that this traditional dilemma is a false one. It leads to either illegitimately separating νοῦς from its organic unity with the body or improperly assimilating it to other parts of the soul. In fact, I argue, νοῦς according to Aristotle does not fall under the narrow definition of soul as something whose activity numerically coincides with an activity of the body, and so no inseparability follows from its definition. At the same time, however, Aristotle finds strong reasons for believing in its inseparability in the nature of its objects: if what it thinks is always the cause for some X of its being Y and if X is only accessible through the perceptive capacity (which is inseparable from the body by its very definition), then our νοῦς cannot be active and, by implication, cannot exist separately from the body. The inference is more problematic when it comes to objects existing separately from matter, such as the movers of the heaven, each of which turns out to be a νοῦς thinking itself independently from a body. And this is why the issue of separability cannot, according to Aristotle, be decided on the level of natural philosophy. There are, nonetheless, good reasons to think that Aristotle&apos;s first philosophy provides, in his eyes, the missing premises supporting an argument that infers that our νοῦς is ontologically inseparable from our body even if we are able to think immaterial objects.

Název v anglickém jazyce

The Nοῦς-Body Relationship in Aristotle's De Anima

Popis výsledku anglicky

Since antiquity interpreters have disagreed as to whether νοῦς (intellect) according to Aristotle is separable from the body or is rather, as a part of the form of the body, inseparable from it by its very definition. I argue that this traditional dilemma is a false one. It leads to either illegitimately separating νοῦς from its organic unity with the body or improperly assimilating it to other parts of the soul. In fact, I argue, νοῦς according to Aristotle does not fall under the narrow definition of soul as something whose activity numerically coincides with an activity of the body, and so no inseparability follows from its definition. At the same time, however, Aristotle finds strong reasons for believing in its inseparability in the nature of its objects: if what it thinks is always the cause for some X of its being Y and if X is only accessible through the perceptive capacity (which is inseparable from the body by its very definition), then our νοῦς cannot be active and, by implication, cannot exist separately from the body. The inference is more problematic when it comes to objects existing separately from matter, such as the movers of the heaven, each of which turns out to be a νοῦς thinking itself independently from a body. And this is why the issue of separability cannot, according to Aristotle, be decided on the level of natural philosophy. There are, nonetheless, good reasons to think that Aristotle&apos;s first philosophy provides, in his eyes, the missing premises supporting an argument that infers that our νοῦς is ontologically inseparable from our body even if we are able to think immaterial objects.

Druh

C - Kapitola v odborné knize

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

60301 - Philosophy, History and Philosophy of science and technology

Projekt

—

Návaznosti

I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Rok uplatnění

2021

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název knihy nebo sborníku

Encounters with Aristotelian Philosophy of Mind

ISBN

978-0-367-43913-2

Počet stran výsledku

32

Strana od-do

249-280

Počet stran knihy

388

Název nakladatele

Routledge

Místo vydání

London

Kód UT WoS kapitoly

—