Thinking of the Unthinkable as Thought
Identifikátory výsledku
Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216208%3A11240%2F20%3A10425464" target="_blank" >RIV/00216208:11240/20:10425464 - isvavai.cz</a>
Výsledek na webu
<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/cpsem201912" target="_blank" >http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/cpsem201912</a>
DOI - Digital Object Identifier
<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/cpsem201912" target="_blank" >10.5840/cpsem201912</a>
Alternativní jazyky
Jazyk výsledku
angličtina
Název v původním jazyce
Thinking of the Unthinkable as Thought
Popis výsledku v původním jazyce
In "Three Essays on Infinity and God" (1859, W 1: 37-43) as well as some other early writings Peirce presented an account of how something unthinkable could be represented. Understanding representation as a "modification of consciousness" (e.g. 1859, W 1: 42; 1861, W 1: 85; March 1862, W 1: 68), Peirce needed to show how the mind can objectively relate to something which cannot be present in it, i.e. cannot be thought. The aim of my paper is to offer a reconstruction of Peirce's theory of mental representation which generated the problem in the first place. I shall argue that Peirce's early view could be interpreted as a species of representationalism in the statement that the immediate contents of consciousness are representations. But by his insistence on that a representation has, as its source, the object thought-of (1859, W 1: 40), it is a representationalism of a very peculiar kind.
Název v anglickém jazyce
Thinking of the Unthinkable as Thought
Popis výsledku anglicky
In "Three Essays on Infinity and God" (1859, W 1: 37-43) as well as some other early writings Peirce presented an account of how something unthinkable could be represented. Understanding representation as a "modification of consciousness" (e.g. 1859, W 1: 42; 1861, W 1: 85; March 1862, W 1: 68), Peirce needed to show how the mind can objectively relate to something which cannot be present in it, i.e. cannot be thought. The aim of my paper is to offer a reconstruction of Peirce's theory of mental representation which generated the problem in the first place. I shall argue that Peirce's early view could be interpreted as a species of representationalism in the statement that the immediate contents of consciousness are representations. But by his insistence on that a representation has, as its source, the object thought-of (1859, W 1: 40), it is a representationalism of a very peculiar kind.
Klasifikace
Druh
D - Stať ve sborníku
CEP obor
—
OECD FORD obor
60301 - Philosophy, History and Philosophy of science and technology
Návaznosti výsledku
Projekt
—
Návaznosti
I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace
Ostatní
Rok uplatnění
2020
Kód důvěrnosti údajů
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů
Údaje specifické pro druh výsledku
Název statě ve sborníku
Semiotics 2019: New Frontiers in Semiotics
ISBN
978-1-63435-061-7
ISSN
—
e-ISSN
—
Počet stran výsledku
11
Strana od-do
43-53
Název nakladatele
Philosophy Documentation Center
Místo vydání
Charlottesville, VA
Místo konání akce
Portland, OR
Datum konání akce
9. 10. 2019
Typ akce podle státní příslušnosti
WRD - Celosvětová akce
Kód UT WoS článku
—