Conceiving the Inconceivability of Conceivability
Identifikátory výsledku
Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216208%3A11240%2F20%3A10421741" target="_blank" >RIV/00216208:11240/20:10421741 - isvavai.cz</a>
Výsledek na webu
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DOI - Digital Object Identifier
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Alternativní jazyky
Jazyk výsledku
angličtina
Název v původním jazyce
Conceiving the Inconceivability of Conceivability
Popis výsledku v původním jazyce
One of the most famous arguments against physicalism is Chalmers' so-called "Conceivability Argument", which infers possibility of a physical state being without a phenomenal state from the conceivability of such a state. This thesis leads to a rejection of physicalism's main thesis of physical states causing phenomenal states. However, Chalmers' idea of conceivability makes a contradictory appeal to something which by his own definition cannot be externally represented, namely the non-existence of zombie twin's phenomenal states. Thus, in general, Chalmers' account lacks a sufficient criterion of representability of the entities and concepts his argument invokes, and the idea of consciousness crossing borders of physically investigable reality loses its foundations. This give rise to a question whether by supplying such criteria drawing from Peirce's semiotics, the conclusion of the argument could be maintained, which the paper aims at answering positively.
Název v anglickém jazyce
Conceiving the Inconceivability of Conceivability
Popis výsledku anglicky
One of the most famous arguments against physicalism is Chalmers' so-called "Conceivability Argument", which infers possibility of a physical state being without a phenomenal state from the conceivability of such a state. This thesis leads to a rejection of physicalism's main thesis of physical states causing phenomenal states. However, Chalmers' idea of conceivability makes a contradictory appeal to something which by his own definition cannot be externally represented, namely the non-existence of zombie twin's phenomenal states. Thus, in general, Chalmers' account lacks a sufficient criterion of representability of the entities and concepts his argument invokes, and the idea of consciousness crossing borders of physically investigable reality loses its foundations. This give rise to a question whether by supplying such criteria drawing from Peirce's semiotics, the conclusion of the argument could be maintained, which the paper aims at answering positively.
Klasifikace
Druh
D - Stať ve sborníku
CEP obor
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OECD FORD obor
60301 - Philosophy, History and Philosophy of science and technology
Návaznosti výsledku
Projekt
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Návaznosti
S - Specificky vyzkum na vysokych skolach<br>I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace
Ostatní
Rok uplatnění
2020
Kód důvěrnosti údajů
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů
Údaje specifické pro druh výsledku
Název statě ve sborníku
Semiotics 2019: New Frontiers in Semiotics
ISBN
978-1-63435-061-7
ISSN
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e-ISSN
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Počet stran výsledku
14
Strana od-do
147-160
Název nakladatele
Philosophy Documentation Center
Místo vydání
Charlottesville, Virginia
Místo konání akce
Portland, OR, USA
Datum konání akce
9. 10. 2019
Typ akce podle státní příslušnosti
WRD - Celosvětová akce
Kód UT WoS článku
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