Hegel's vanity: Schelling's early critique of absolute idealism

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216208%3A11240%2F23%3A10458333" target="_blank" >RIV/00216208:11240/23:10458333 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://verso.is.cuni.cz/pub/verso.fpl?fname=obd_publikace_handle&handle=QfHSZPM9zE" target="_blank" >https://verso.is.cuni.cz/pub/verso.fpl?fname=obd_publikace_handle&handle=QfHSZPM9zE</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/21692327.2023.2188243" target="_blank" >10.1080/21692327.2023.2188243</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Hegel's vanity: Schelling's early critique of absolute idealism

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

In this article, we present for the first time Schelling&apos;s early critique of absolute idealism within his middle metaphysics (1804-1820), which has great relevance and influence on the subsequent course of German philosophy, and, more broadly considered, on later systematic thinking about the categories of unity and duality. We aim to show how Schelling defends a form of metaphysical duality, from 1804 onwards, without relapsing into a stronger Kantian dualism. In this sense, our author rejects both the dualism between nature and spirit, necessity and freedom, as well as the monist-immanent metaphysical stance later associated with Hegelian panlogism. Against Hegel, Schelling increasingly vindicates the reality of the finite and degrades the infinite to mere ideality in a movement that resembles later existentialism. Furthermore, we defend Schelling against the accusation of irrationalism that sections of Hegelianism formulated against him and present the concept of infinity without the notion of totality, which he thinks of, much like Fichte, in the light of the concept of an &apos;infinite task&apos;. Schelling&apos;s later criticisms of Hegel are shown to be influenced by his early idealist critique of the period at hand.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Hegel's vanity: Schelling's early critique of absolute idealism

Popis výsledku anglicky

In this article, we present for the first time Schelling&apos;s early critique of absolute idealism within his middle metaphysics (1804-1820), which has great relevance and influence on the subsequent course of German philosophy, and, more broadly considered, on later systematic thinking about the categories of unity and duality. We aim to show how Schelling defends a form of metaphysical duality, from 1804 onwards, without relapsing into a stronger Kantian dualism. In this sense, our author rejects both the dualism between nature and spirit, necessity and freedom, as well as the monist-immanent metaphysical stance later associated with Hegelian panlogism. Against Hegel, Schelling increasingly vindicates the reality of the finite and degrades the infinite to mere ideality in a movement that resembles later existentialism. Furthermore, we defend Schelling against the accusation of irrationalism that sections of Hegelianism formulated against him and present the concept of infinity without the notion of totality, which he thinks of, much like Fichte, in the light of the concept of an &apos;infinite task&apos;. Schelling&apos;s later criticisms of Hegel are shown to be influenced by his early idealist critique of the period at hand.

Druh

J_imp - Článek v periodiku v databázi Web of Science

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

60301 - Philosophy, History and Philosophy of science and technology

Projekt

—

Návaznosti

I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Rok uplatnění

2023

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

International Journal of Philosophy and Theology

ISSN

2169-2327

e-ISSN

2169-2335

Svazek periodika

84

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

1

Stát vydavatele periodika

GB - Spojené království Velké Británie a Severního Irska

Počet stran výsledku

17

Strana od-do

1-17

Kód UT WoS článku

000952940700001

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-85150832597