Finite Freedom and its split from the Absolute in Schelling's Bruno

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216208%3A11240%2F24%3A10480877" target="_blank" >RIV/00216208:11240/24:10480877 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://verso.is.cuni.cz/pub/verso.fpl?fname=obd_publikace_handle&handle=-UDQi-45.4" target="_blank" >https://verso.is.cuni.cz/pub/verso.fpl?fname=obd_publikace_handle&handle=-UDQi-45.4</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/nzsth-2024-0015" target="_blank" >10.1515/nzsth-2024-0015</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Finite Freedom and its split from the Absolute in Schelling's Bruno

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

The dialogue Bruno of 1802 is arguably the natural starting point for any investigation on the concepts of finitude, evil and human freedom in Schelling&apos;s middle metaphysics. In this dialogue the author elaborates for the first time in his system a concept of freedom and independence of the finite, which extends via his reformulation in Philosophy and Religion of 1804 to the Freedom Essay of 1809 and beyond to the works of 1810 and 1811 - Stuttgart Private Lectures and The Ages of the World. The central ontological problem of the dialogue relates to the possibility of a separation between the absolute and the world as space of finite beings, which, according to the system of identity first presented in 1801, cannot exist as such. The question we will then address concerns the status of the finite as such and how would it be possible to admit both its existence for consciousness and the positing of an absolute and infinite principle of philosophy. We will show how Schelling&apos;s interest shifts, almost unintentionally, from the infinite principle to the finite as such, as a principle of freedom and self-initiation independent of the real.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Finite Freedom and its split from the Absolute in Schelling's Bruno

Popis výsledku anglicky

The dialogue Bruno of 1802 is arguably the natural starting point for any investigation on the concepts of finitude, evil and human freedom in Schelling&apos;s middle metaphysics. In this dialogue the author elaborates for the first time in his system a concept of freedom and independence of the finite, which extends via his reformulation in Philosophy and Religion of 1804 to the Freedom Essay of 1809 and beyond to the works of 1810 and 1811 - Stuttgart Private Lectures and The Ages of the World. The central ontological problem of the dialogue relates to the possibility of a separation between the absolute and the world as space of finite beings, which, according to the system of identity first presented in 1801, cannot exist as such. The question we will then address concerns the status of the finite as such and how would it be possible to admit both its existence for consciousness and the positing of an absolute and infinite principle of philosophy. We will show how Schelling&apos;s interest shifts, almost unintentionally, from the infinite principle to the finite as such, as a principle of freedom and self-initiation independent of the real.

Druh

J_imp - Článek v periodiku v databázi Web of Science

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

60301 - Philosophy, History and Philosophy of science and technology

Projekt

—

Návaznosti

I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Rok uplatnění

2024

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Neue Zeitschrift fur Systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie

ISSN

0028-3517

e-ISSN

1612-9520

Svazek periodika

66

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

2

Stát vydavatele periodika

DE - Spolková republika Německo

Počet stran výsledku

23

Strana od-do

93-115

Kód UT WoS článku

001223141300001

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-85193825117