The effect of fight cost structure on fighting behaviour

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216208%3A11320%2F15%3A10317847" target="_blank" >RIV/00216208:11320/15:10317847 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00285-014-0848-x" target="_blank" >http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00285-014-0848-x</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00285-014-0848-x" target="_blank" >10.1007/s00285-014-0848-x</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

The effect of fight cost structure on fighting behaviour

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

A common feature of animal populations is the stealing by animals of resources such as food from other animals. This has previously been the subject of a range of modelling approaches, one of which is the so called "producer-scrounger" model. In this model a producer finds a resource that takes some time to be consumed, and some time later a (generally) conspecific scrounger discovers the producer with its resource and potentially attempts to steal it. In this paper we consider a variant of this scenario where each individual can choose to invest an amount of energy into this contest, and the level of investment of each individual determines the probability of it winning the contest, but also the additional cost it has to bear. We analyse the model fora specific set of cost functions and maximum investment levels and show how the evolutionarily stable behaviour depends upon them. In particular we see that for high levels of maximum investment, the producer keeps the resource without a

Název v anglickém jazyce

The effect of fight cost structure on fighting behaviour

Popis výsledku anglicky

A common feature of animal populations is the stealing by animals of resources such as food from other animals. This has previously been the subject of a range of modelling approaches, one of which is the so called "producer-scrounger" model. In this model a producer finds a resource that takes some time to be consumed, and some time later a (generally) conspecific scrounger discovers the producer with its resource and potentially attempts to steal it. In this paper we consider a variant of this scenario where each individual can choose to invest an amount of energy into this contest, and the level of investment of each individual determines the probability of it winning the contest, but also the additional cost it has to bear. We analyse the model fora specific set of cost functions and maximum investment levels and show how the evolutionarily stable behaviour depends upon them. In particular we see that for high levels of maximum investment, the producer keeps the resource without a

Druh

J_x - Nezařazeno - Článek v odborném periodiku (Jimp, Jsc a Jost)

CEP obor

BA - Obecná matematika

OECD FORD obor

—

Projekt

<a href="/cs/project/GAP201%2F11%2F0345" target="_blank" >GAP201/11/0345: Nelineární funkcionální analýza</a><br>

Návaznosti

I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Rok uplatnění

2015

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Journal of Mathematical Biology

ISSN

0303-6812

e-ISSN

—

Svazek periodika

71

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

4

Stát vydavatele periodika

DE - Spolková republika Německo

Počet stran výsledku

18

Strana od-do

979-996

Kód UT WoS článku

000360851700009

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-84941333347