The asymmetric Hawk-Dove game with costs measured as time lost

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F60077344%3A_____%2F22%3A00557895" target="_blank" >RIV/60077344:_____/22:00557895 - isvavai.cz</a>

Nalezeny alternativní kódy

RIV/60076658:12310/22:43904905

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022519322001606/pdfft?md5=9b20baa1aa4886129305aaa5b19ffc58&pid=1-s2.0-S0022519322001606-main.pdf" target="_blank" >https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022519322001606/pdfft?md5=9b20baa1aa4886129305aaa5b19ffc58&pid=1-s2.0-S0022519322001606-main.pdf</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2022.111162" target="_blank" >10.1016/j.jtbi.2022.111162</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

The asymmetric Hawk-Dove game with costs measured as time lost

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

The classic Hawk-Dove game is a symmetric game in that it does not distinguish between the winners and losers of Hawk-Hawk or Dove-Dove contests. Either of the two interacting Hawks or the two interacting Doves have the same probability to win/lose the contest. In addition, all pairwise interactions take the same time and after disbanding, the individuals pair instantaneously again. This article develops an asymmetric version of the Hawk-Dove model where all costs are measured by the time lost. These times are strategy dependent and measure the length of the conflict and, when a fight occurs between two interacting Hawks, the time an individual needs to recover and pair again. These recovery times depend on whether the Hawk won or lost the contest so that we consider an asymmetric Hawk-Dove game where we distinguish between winners and losers. However, the payoff matrix for this game does not correspond to the standard bimatrix game, because some entries are undefined. To calculate strategy payoffs we consider not only costs and benefits obtained from pairwise contests but also costs when individuals are disbanded. Depending on the interacting and recovery times, the evolutionary outcomes are: Hawk only, both Hawk and Dove, and a mixed strategy. This shows that measuring the cost in time lost leads to a new prediction since, in the classic (symmetric) Hawk-Dove model that does assume positive cost (C higher 0), both Hawk and Dove strategy is never an evolutionary outcome.

Název v anglickém jazyce

The asymmetric Hawk-Dove game with costs measured as time lost

Popis výsledku anglicky

The classic Hawk-Dove game is a symmetric game in that it does not distinguish between the winners and losers of Hawk-Hawk or Dove-Dove contests. Either of the two interacting Hawks or the two interacting Doves have the same probability to win/lose the contest. In addition, all pairwise interactions take the same time and after disbanding, the individuals pair instantaneously again. This article develops an asymmetric version of the Hawk-Dove model where all costs are measured by the time lost. These times are strategy dependent and measure the length of the conflict and, when a fight occurs between two interacting Hawks, the time an individual needs to recover and pair again. These recovery times depend on whether the Hawk won or lost the contest so that we consider an asymmetric Hawk-Dove game where we distinguish between winners and losers. However, the payoff matrix for this game does not correspond to the standard bimatrix game, because some entries are undefined. To calculate strategy payoffs we consider not only costs and benefits obtained from pairwise contests but also costs when individuals are disbanded. Depending on the interacting and recovery times, the evolutionary outcomes are: Hawk only, both Hawk and Dove, and a mixed strategy. This shows that measuring the cost in time lost leads to a new prediction since, in the classic (symmetric) Hawk-Dove model that does assume positive cost (C higher 0), both Hawk and Dove strategy is never an evolutionary outcome.

Druh

J_imp - Článek v periodiku v databázi Web of Science

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

10602 - Biology (theoretical, mathematical, thermal, cryobiology, biological rhythm), Evolutionary biology

Projekt

—

Návaznosti

I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Rok uplatnění

2022

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Journal of Theoretical Biology

ISSN

0022-5193

e-ISSN

1095-8541

Svazek periodika

547

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

AUG 21

Stát vydavatele periodika

GB - Spojené království Velké Británie a Severního Irska

Počet stran výsledku

10

Strana od-do

111162

Kód UT WoS článku

000841782100001

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-85131458143