Beyond replicator dynamics: From frequency to density dependent models of evolutionary games

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F60076658%3A12310%2F18%3A43897500" target="_blank" >RIV/60076658:12310/18:43897500 - isvavai.cz</a>

Nalezeny alternativní kódy

RIV/60077344:_____/18:00491945

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://reader.elsevier.com/reader/sd/pii/S0022519318303163?token=23334414DDC132F38F473C7631EE3C23926A115A4098CC6AEA746FDD7353A27D9555A4F15494731C1DE9DA8FF9BFB611" target="_blank" >https://reader.elsevier.com/reader/sd/pii/S0022519318303163?token=23334414DDC132F38F473C7631EE3C23926A115A4098CC6AEA746FDD7353A27D9555A4F15494731C1DE9DA8FF9BFB611</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2018.07.003" target="_blank" >10.1016/j.jtbi.2018.07.003</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Beyond replicator dynamics: From frequency to density dependent models of evolutionary games

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

Game theoretic models of evolution such as the Hawk-Dove game assume that individuals gain fitness (which is a proxy of the per capita population growth rate) in pair-wise contests only. These models assume that the equilibrium distribution of phenotypes involved (e.g., Hawks and Doves) in the population is given by the Hardy-Weinberg law, which is based on instantaneous, random pair formation. On the other hand, models of population dynamics do not consider pairs, newborns are produced by singles, and interactions between phenotypes or species are described by the mass action principle. This article links game theoretic and population approaches. It shows that combining distribution dynamics with population dynamics can lead to stable coexistence of Hawk and Dove population numbers in models that do not assume a priori that fitness is negative density dependent. Our analysis shows clearly that the interior Nash equilibrium of the Hawk and Dove model depends both on population size and on interaction times between different phenotypes in the population. This raises the question of the applicability of classic evolutionary game theory that requires all interactions take the same amount of time and that all single individuals have the same payoff per unit of time, to real populations. Furthermore, by separating individual fitness into birth and death effects on singles and pairs, it is shown that stable coexistence in these models depends on the time-scale of the distribution dynamics relative to the population dynamics. When explicit density-dependent fitness is included through competition over a limited resource, the combined dynamics of the Hawk-Dove model often lead to Dove extinction no matter how costly fighting is for Hawk pairs. (C) 2018 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Beyond replicator dynamics: From frequency to density dependent models of evolutionary games

Popis výsledku anglicky

Game theoretic models of evolution such as the Hawk-Dove game assume that individuals gain fitness (which is a proxy of the per capita population growth rate) in pair-wise contests only. These models assume that the equilibrium distribution of phenotypes involved (e.g., Hawks and Doves) in the population is given by the Hardy-Weinberg law, which is based on instantaneous, random pair formation. On the other hand, models of population dynamics do not consider pairs, newborns are produced by singles, and interactions between phenotypes or species are described by the mass action principle. This article links game theoretic and population approaches. It shows that combining distribution dynamics with population dynamics can lead to stable coexistence of Hawk and Dove population numbers in models that do not assume a priori that fitness is negative density dependent. Our analysis shows clearly that the interior Nash equilibrium of the Hawk and Dove model depends both on population size and on interaction times between different phenotypes in the population. This raises the question of the applicability of classic evolutionary game theory that requires all interactions take the same amount of time and that all single individuals have the same payoff per unit of time, to real populations. Furthermore, by separating individual fitness into birth and death effects on singles and pairs, it is shown that stable coexistence in these models depends on the time-scale of the distribution dynamics relative to the population dynamics. When explicit density-dependent fitness is included through competition over a limited resource, the combined dynamics of the Hawk-Dove model often lead to Dove extinction no matter how costly fighting is for Hawk pairs. (C) 2018 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Druh

J_imp - Článek v periodiku v databázi Web of Science

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

10602 - Biology (theoretical, mathematical, thermal, cryobiology, biological rhythm), Evolutionary biology

Projekt

—

Návaznosti

I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Rok uplatnění

2018

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Journal of Theoretical Biology

ISSN

0022-5193

e-ISSN

—

Svazek periodika

455

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

OCT 14 2018

Stát vydavatele periodika

GB - Spojené království Velké Británie a Severního Irska

Počet stran výsledku

17

Strana od-do

232-248

Kód UT WoS článku

000444361100024

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-85050849587