Interaction times change evolutionary outcomes: Two-player matrix games

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F60076658%3A12310%2F17%3A43895469" target="_blank" >RIV/60076658:12310/17:43895469 - isvavai.cz</a>

Nalezeny alternativní kódy

RIV/60077344:_____/17:00469566

Výsledek na webu

<a href="http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022519317300103?via%3Dihub" target="_blank" >http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022519317300103?via%3Dihub</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2017.01.10" target="_blank" >10.1016/j.jtbi.2017.01.10</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Interaction times change evolutionary outcomes: Two-player matrix games

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

Two most influential models of evolutionary game theory are the Hawk-Dove and Prisoner&apos;s dilemma models. The Hawk-Dove model explains evolution of aggressiveness, predicting individuals should be aggressive when the cost of fighting is lower than its benefit. As the cost of aggressiveness increases and outweighs benefits, aggressiveness in the population should decrease. Similarly, the Prisoner&apos;s dilemma models evolution of cooperation. It predicts that individuals should never cooperate despite cooperation leading to a higher collective fitness than defection. The question is then what are the conditions under which cooperation evolves? These classic matrix games, which are based on pair-wise interactions between two opponents with player payoffs given in matrix form, do not consider the effect that conflict duration has on payoffs. However, interactions between different strategies often take different amounts of time. In this article, we develop a new approach to an old idea that opportunity costs lost while engaged in an interaction affect individual fitness. When applied to the Hawk-Dove and Prisoner&apos;s dilemma, our theory that incorporates general interaction times leads to qualitatively different predictions. In particular, not all individuals will behave as Hawks when fighting cost is lower than benefit, and cooperation will evolve in the Prisoner&apos;s dilemma.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Interaction times change evolutionary outcomes: Two-player matrix games

Popis výsledku anglicky

Two most influential models of evolutionary game theory are the Hawk-Dove and Prisoner&apos;s dilemma models. The Hawk-Dove model explains evolution of aggressiveness, predicting individuals should be aggressive when the cost of fighting is lower than its benefit. As the cost of aggressiveness increases and outweighs benefits, aggressiveness in the population should decrease. Similarly, the Prisoner&apos;s dilemma models evolution of cooperation. It predicts that individuals should never cooperate despite cooperation leading to a higher collective fitness than defection. The question is then what are the conditions under which cooperation evolves? These classic matrix games, which are based on pair-wise interactions between two opponents with player payoffs given in matrix form, do not consider the effect that conflict duration has on payoffs. However, interactions between different strategies often take different amounts of time. In this article, we develop a new approach to an old idea that opportunity costs lost while engaged in an interaction affect individual fitness. When applied to the Hawk-Dove and Prisoner&apos;s dilemma, our theory that incorporates general interaction times leads to qualitatively different predictions. In particular, not all individuals will behave as Hawks when fighting cost is lower than benefit, and cooperation will evolve in the Prisoner&apos;s dilemma.

Druh

J_imp - Článek v periodiku v databázi Web of Science

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

10602 - Biology (theoretical, mathematical, thermal, cryobiology, biological rhythm), Evolutionary biology

Projekt

—

Návaznosti

I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Rok uplatnění

2017

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Journal of Theoretical Biology

ISSN

0022-5193

e-ISSN

—

Svazek periodika

416

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

MAR 7 2017

Stát vydavatele periodika

GB - Spojené království Velké Británie a Severního Irska

Počet stran výsledku

9

Strana od-do

199-207

Kód UT WoS článku

000396798400020

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

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