Tortoise and Hares Consensus: The Meshcash Framework for Incentive-Compatible, Scalable Cryptocurrencies

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216208%3A11320%2F21%3A10437506" target="_blank" >RIV/00216208:11320/21:10437506 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007%2F978-3-030-78086-9_9" target="_blank" >https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007%2F978-3-030-78086-9_9</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-78086-9_9" target="_blank" >10.1007/978-3-030-78086-9_9</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Tortoise and Hares Consensus: The Meshcash Framework for Incentive-Compatible, Scalable Cryptocurrencies

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

We propose Meshcash, a protocol for implementing a permissionless ledger (blockchain) via proofs of work, suitable for use as the underlying consensus mechanism of a cryptocurrency. Unlike most existing proof-of-work based consensus protocols, Meshcash does not rely on leader-election (e.g., the single miner who managed to extend the longest chain). Rather, we use ideas from traditional (permissioned) Byzantine agreement protocols in a novel way to guarantee convergence to a consensus from any starting state. Our construction combines a local &quot;hare&quot; protocol that guarantees fast consensus on recent blocks (but doesn&apos;t, by itself, imply irreversibility) with a global &quot;tortoise&quot; protocol that guarantees irreversibility. Our global protocol also allows the ledger to &quot;self-heal&quot; from arbitrary violations of the security assumptions, reconverging to consensus after the assumptions hold again. Meshcash is designed to be race-free: there is no &quot;race&quot; to generate the next block and honestly-generated blocks are always rewarded. This property, which we define formally as a game-theoretic notion, turns out to be useful in analyzing rational miners&apos; behavior: we prove (using a generalization of the blockchain mining games of Kiayias et al.) that race-free blockchain protocols are incentive-compatible and satisfy linearity of rewards (i.e., a party receives rewards proportional to its computational power). Because Meshcash can tolerate a high block rate regardless of network propagation delays (which will only affect latency), it allows us to lower both the variance and the expected time between blocks for honest miners; together with linearity of rewards, this makes pooled mining far less attractive. Moreover, race-free protocols scale more easily (in terms of transaction rate). This is because the race-free property implies that the network propagation delays are not a factor in terms of rewards, which removes the main impediment to accommodating a larger volume of transactions. We formally prove that all of our guarantees hold in the bounded-delay communication model of Pass, Seeman and shelat, and against a constant fraction of Byzantine (malicious) miners; not just rational ones.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Tortoise and Hares Consensus: The Meshcash Framework for Incentive-Compatible, Scalable Cryptocurrencies

Popis výsledku anglicky

We propose Meshcash, a protocol for implementing a permissionless ledger (blockchain) via proofs of work, suitable for use as the underlying consensus mechanism of a cryptocurrency. Unlike most existing proof-of-work based consensus protocols, Meshcash does not rely on leader-election (e.g., the single miner who managed to extend the longest chain). Rather, we use ideas from traditional (permissioned) Byzantine agreement protocols in a novel way to guarantee convergence to a consensus from any starting state. Our construction combines a local &quot;hare&quot; protocol that guarantees fast consensus on recent blocks (but doesn&apos;t, by itself, imply irreversibility) with a global &quot;tortoise&quot; protocol that guarantees irreversibility. Our global protocol also allows the ledger to &quot;self-heal&quot; from arbitrary violations of the security assumptions, reconverging to consensus after the assumptions hold again. Meshcash is designed to be race-free: there is no &quot;race&quot; to generate the next block and honestly-generated blocks are always rewarded. This property, which we define formally as a game-theoretic notion, turns out to be useful in analyzing rational miners&apos; behavior: we prove (using a generalization of the blockchain mining games of Kiayias et al.) that race-free blockchain protocols are incentive-compatible and satisfy linearity of rewards (i.e., a party receives rewards proportional to its computational power). Because Meshcash can tolerate a high block rate regardless of network propagation delays (which will only affect latency), it allows us to lower both the variance and the expected time between blocks for honest miners; together with linearity of rewards, this makes pooled mining far less attractive. Moreover, race-free protocols scale more easily (in terms of transaction rate). This is because the race-free property implies that the network propagation delays are not a factor in terms of rewards, which removes the main impediment to accommodating a larger volume of transactions. We formally prove that all of our guarantees hold in the bounded-delay communication model of Pass, Seeman and shelat, and against a constant fraction of Byzantine (malicious) miners; not just rational ones.

Druh

D - Stať ve sborníku

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

10201 - Computer sciences, information science, bioinformathics (hardware development to be 2.2, social aspect to be 5.8)

Projekt

—

Návaznosti

I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Rok uplatnění

2021

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název statě ve sborníku

Cyber Security Cryptography and Machine Learning - 5th International Symposium, CSCML 2021, Be&apos;er Sheva, Israel, July 8-9, 2021, Proceedings

ISBN

978-3-030-78085-2

ISSN

—

e-ISSN

—

Počet stran výsledku

14

Strana od-do

114-127

Název nakladatele

Springer

Místo vydání

Berlin

Místo konání akce

Be&apos;er Sheva, Israel

Datum konání akce

8. 7. 2021

Typ akce podle státní příslušnosti

WRD - Celosvětová akce

Kód UT WoS článku

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