Incentive Attacks on DAG-Based Blockchains with Random Transaction Selection

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216305%3A26230%2F23%3APU149364" target="_blank" >RIV/00216305:26230/23:PU149364 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/Blockchain60715.2023.00011" target="_blank" >http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/Blockchain60715.2023.00011</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/Blockchain60715.2023.00011" target="_blank" >10.1109/Blockchain60715.2023.00011</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Incentive Attacks on DAG-Based Blockchains with Random Transaction Selection

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

Several blockchain consensus protocols proposed to use Directed Acyclic Graphs (DAGs) to solve the limited processing throughput of traditional single-chain Proof-of-Work (PoW) blockchains. Many such protocols utilize a random transaction selection strategy (e.g., PHANTOM, GHOSTDAG, SPECTRE, Inclusive, and Prism) to avoid transaction duplicities across parallel blocks in DAG and thus maximize the network throughput. However, previous research has not rigorously examined incentive-oriented malicious behaviors when transaction selection deviates from the protocol, which motivated our research. In the scope of this work, we perform a game-theoretic analysis of the generic DAG-based blockchain protocol that uses the random transaction selection strategy, proving that such a strategy does not represent a Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, we develop a blockchain simulator that extends existing open-source tools to support multiple chains and explore incentive-based deviations from the protocol. Our simulations of simple network topology with ten miners confirm our conclusion from the game-theoretic analysis. The simulations show that malicious actors who do not follow the random transaction selection strategy can profit more than honest miners. This has a detrimental effect on the processing throughput of the protocol because duplicate transactions are included in more than one block of different chains. Moreover, we show that malicious miners are incentivized to form a shared mining pool to increase their profit. This undermines the network's decentralization and degrades the design of the protocols in question.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Incentive Attacks on DAG-Based Blockchains with Random Transaction Selection

Popis výsledku anglicky

Several blockchain consensus protocols proposed to use Directed Acyclic Graphs (DAGs) to solve the limited processing throughput of traditional single-chain Proof-of-Work (PoW) blockchains. Many such protocols utilize a random transaction selection strategy (e.g., PHANTOM, GHOSTDAG, SPECTRE, Inclusive, and Prism) to avoid transaction duplicities across parallel blocks in DAG and thus maximize the network throughput. However, previous research has not rigorously examined incentive-oriented malicious behaviors when transaction selection deviates from the protocol, which motivated our research. In the scope of this work, we perform a game-theoretic analysis of the generic DAG-based blockchain protocol that uses the random transaction selection strategy, proving that such a strategy does not represent a Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, we develop a blockchain simulator that extends existing open-source tools to support multiple chains and explore incentive-based deviations from the protocol. Our simulations of simple network topology with ten miners confirm our conclusion from the game-theoretic analysis. The simulations show that malicious actors who do not follow the random transaction selection strategy can profit more than honest miners. This has a detrimental effect on the processing throughput of the protocol because duplicate transactions are included in more than one block of different chains. Moreover, we show that malicious miners are incentivized to form a shared mining pool to increase their profit. This undermines the network's decentralization and degrades the design of the protocols in question.

Druh

D - Stať ve sborníku

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

10201 - Computer sciences, information science, bioinformathics (hardware development to be 2.2, social aspect to be 5.8)

Projekt

—

Návaznosti

S - Specificky vyzkum na vysokych skolach

Rok uplatnění

2023

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název statě ve sborníku

IEEE International Conference on Blockchain

ISBN

979-8-3503-1929-3

ISSN

—

e-ISSN

—

Počet stran výsledku

8

Strana od-do

1-8

Název nakladatele

Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.

Místo vydání

neuveden

Místo konání akce

Hainan, China

Datum konání akce

17. 12. 2023

Typ akce podle státní příslušnosti

WRD - Celosvětová akce

Kód UT WoS článku

001165130100001