Monopolní vysílání upoutávek

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216208%3A11640%2F08%3A00312862" target="_blank" >RIV/00216208:11640/08:00312862 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

—

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

—

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Monopoly provision of tune-ins

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

This paper analyzes a single television station's choice of airing tune-ins (preview advertisements). I consider two consecutive programs located along a unit line. Potential viewers know the earlier program but are uncertain about the later one. The TVstation may air a fully informative tune-in during the first program. The cost of the tune-in is the forgone advertising revenue. Under mild conditions, there exists a unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which some viewers watch the first program justto see if there is a tune-in or not, and the TV station airs a tune-in unless the two programs are too dissimilar. In the absence of a tune-in, no viewer within the first-period audience keeps watching TV. Full information disclosure never arises. The market outcome is suboptimal; a social planner would air a tune-in for a wider range of programs.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Monopoly provision of tune-ins

Popis výsledku anglicky

This paper analyzes a single television station's choice of airing tune-ins (preview advertisements). I consider two consecutive programs located along a unit line. Potential viewers know the earlier program but are uncertain about the later one. The TVstation may air a fully informative tune-in during the first program. The cost of the tune-in is the forgone advertising revenue. Under mild conditions, there exists a unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which some viewers watch the first program justto see if there is a tune-in or not, and the TV station airs a tune-in unless the two programs are too dissimilar. In the absence of a tune-in, no viewer within the first-period audience keeps watching TV. Full information disclosure never arises. The market outcome is suboptimal; a social planner would air a tune-in for a wider range of programs.

Druh

J_x - Nezařazeno - Článek v odborném periodiku (Jimp, Jsc a Jost)

CEP obor

AH - Ekonomie

OECD FORD obor

—

Projekt

—

Návaznosti

Z - Vyzkumny zamer (s odkazem do CEZ)

Rok uplatnění

2008

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

CERGE-EI Working Paper Series

ISSN

1211-3298

e-ISSN

—

Svazek periodika

-

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

362

Stát vydavatele periodika

CZ - Česká republika

Počet stran výsledku

31

Strana od-do

—

Kód UT WoS článku

—

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

—