Competitive provision of tune-ins under common private information

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216208%3A11640%2F16%3A00459226" target="_blank" >RIV/00216208:11640/16:00459226 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2015.10.002" target="_blank" >http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2015.10.002</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2015.10.002" target="_blank" >10.1016/j.ijindorg.2015.10.002</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Competitive provision of tune-ins under common private information

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

Television (TV) stations forego millions of dollars of advertising revenues by airing tune-ins (preview advertisements) for their upcoming programs. In this paper, I analyze the equilibrium as well as welfare properties of tune-ins in a duopolistic TV market that lasts for two periods. Importantly, each TV station is fully informed about its own as well as its rival's program. Viewers receive information via tune-ins, if any, or alternatively by sampling a program for a few minutes (and switching across stations). I find that equilibrium tune-in decisions do not necessarily depend on TV stations' knowledge of their rival's program. In this case, the opportunity costs of tune-ins could be so high that a regime without any tune-ins may be socially better. However, when tune-ins depend on both of the upcoming programs, it is possible that they enhance welfare by helping viewers avoid some of the inefficient program sampling they would otherwise do in a regime without any tune-ins.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Competitive provision of tune-ins under common private information

Popis výsledku anglicky

Television (TV) stations forego millions of dollars of advertising revenues by airing tune-ins (preview advertisements) for their upcoming programs. In this paper, I analyze the equilibrium as well as welfare properties of tune-ins in a duopolistic TV market that lasts for two periods. Importantly, each TV station is fully informed about its own as well as its rival's program. Viewers receive information via tune-ins, if any, or alternatively by sampling a program for a few minutes (and switching across stations). I find that equilibrium tune-in decisions do not necessarily depend on TV stations' knowledge of their rival's program. In this case, the opportunity costs of tune-ins could be so high that a regime without any tune-ins may be socially better. However, when tune-ins depend on both of the upcoming programs, it is possible that they enhance welfare by helping viewers avoid some of the inefficient program sampling they would otherwise do in a regime without any tune-ins.

Druh

J_x - Nezařazeno - Článek v odborném periodiku (Jimp, Jsc a Jost)

CEP obor

AH - Ekonomie

OECD FORD obor

—

Projekt

—

Návaznosti

I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Rok uplatnění

2016

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

International Journal of Industrial Organization

ISSN

0167-7187

e-ISSN

—

Svazek periodika

44

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

January

Stát vydavatele periodika

NL - Nizozemsko

Počet stran výsledku

10

Strana od-do

113-122

Kód UT WoS článku

000368746600009

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-84948953687