Persistence of monopoly, innovation, and R&D spillovers

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216208%3A11640%2F16%3A00468782" target="_blank" >RIV/00216208:11640/16:00468782 - isvavai.cz</a>

Nalezeny alternativní kódy

RIV/67985998:_____/16:00466280

Výsledek na webu

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.rie.2016.07.006" target="_blank" >http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.rie.2016.07.006</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.rie.2016.07.006" target="_blank" >10.1016/j.rie.2016.07.006</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Persistence of monopoly, innovation, and R&D spillovers

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

We build a dynamic duopoly model that accounts for the empirical observation of monopoly persistence in the long run. More specifically, we analyze the conditions under which it is optimal for the market leader to undertake pre-emptive R&D investment (“strategic predation strategy) that eventually leads to exit of the follower firm. The follower is assumed to benefit from innovative activities of the leader through R&D spillovers. We show that strategic predation becomes an attractive strategy to embrace when the efficiency of R&D is high enough and when R&D spillovers are not large. The steady-state values of R&D investment in a dynamic model can be interpreted as the generalized values of the equilibrium values obtained in the corresponding static model. Finally, a distinct implication of our dynamic set-up is that it provides an explanation for the puzzling empirical findings, namely the presence of both negative (or not significant) and positive R&D spillovers from FDI in transition and emerging economies.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Persistence of monopoly, innovation, and R&D spillovers

Popis výsledku anglicky

We build a dynamic duopoly model that accounts for the empirical observation of monopoly persistence in the long run. More specifically, we analyze the conditions under which it is optimal for the market leader to undertake pre-emptive R&D investment (“strategic predation strategy) that eventually leads to exit of the follower firm. The follower is assumed to benefit from innovative activities of the leader through R&D spillovers. We show that strategic predation becomes an attractive strategy to embrace when the efficiency of R&D is high enough and when R&D spillovers are not large. The steady-state values of R&D investment in a dynamic model can be interpreted as the generalized values of the equilibrium values obtained in the corresponding static model. Finally, a distinct implication of our dynamic set-up is that it provides an explanation for the puzzling empirical findings, namely the presence of both negative (or not significant) and positive R&D spillovers from FDI in transition and emerging economies.

Druh

J_x - Nezařazeno - Článek v odborném periodiku (Jimp, Jsc a Jost)

CEP obor

AH - Ekonomie

OECD FORD obor

—

Projekt

<a href="/cs/project/GA15-24642S" target="_blank" >GA15-24642S: Dopady globalizace a zahraničních investic na inovace a efektivitu domácích firem</a><br>

Návaznosti

I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Rok uplatnění

2016

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Research in Economics

ISSN

1090-9443

e-ISSN

—

Svazek periodika

70

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

4

Stát vydavatele periodika

GB - Spojené království Velké Británie a Severního Irska

Počet stran výsledku

21

Strana od-do

714-734

Kód UT WoS článku

—

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-84997343310