Crafting consensus

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216208%3A11640%2F17%3A00479524" target="_blank" >RIV/00216208:11640/17:00479524 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11127-017-0470-8" target="_blank" >http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11127-017-0470-8</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11127-017-0470-8" target="_blank" >10.1007/s11127-017-0470-8</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Crafting consensus

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

The paper analyzes the problem of a committee chair using favors at her disposal to maximize the likelihood that her proposal gains committee support. The favors increase the probability of a given member approving the chair’s proposal via a smooth voting function. The decision-making protocol is any quota voting rule. The paper characterizes the optimal allocation of any given level of favors and the optimal expenditure-minimizing level of favors. The optimal allocation divides favors uniformly among a coalition of the committee members. At a low level of favors, the coalition comprises all committee members. At a high level, it is the minimum winning coalition. The optimal expenditure level guarantees the chair certain support of the minimum winning coalition if favors are abundant and uncertain support of all committee members if favors are scarce, elitist or egalitarian committees are compatible with a strategic chair. The results are robust to changing the chair’s objectives and to alternative voting functions, and reconcile theoretical predictions with empirical observations about legislative bargaining experiments, lobby vote buying and executive lawmaking.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Crafting consensus

Popis výsledku anglicky

The paper analyzes the problem of a committee chair using favors at her disposal to maximize the likelihood that her proposal gains committee support. The favors increase the probability of a given member approving the chair’s proposal via a smooth voting function. The decision-making protocol is any quota voting rule. The paper characterizes the optimal allocation of any given level of favors and the optimal expenditure-minimizing level of favors. The optimal allocation divides favors uniformly among a coalition of the committee members. At a low level of favors, the coalition comprises all committee members. At a high level, it is the minimum winning coalition. The optimal expenditure level guarantees the chair certain support of the minimum winning coalition if favors are abundant and uncertain support of all committee members if favors are scarce, elitist or egalitarian committees are compatible with a strategic chair. The results are robust to changing the chair’s objectives and to alternative voting functions, and reconcile theoretical predictions with empirical observations about legislative bargaining experiments, lobby vote buying and executive lawmaking.

Druh

J_imp - Článek v periodiku v databázi Web of Science

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

50201 - Economic Theory

Projekt

<a href="/cs/project/GP14-27902P" target="_blank" >GP14-27902P: Teorie předkládání návrhů s nejistým souhlasem</a><br>

Návaznosti

P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)

Rok uplatnění

2017

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Public Choice

ISSN

0048-5829

e-ISSN

—

Svazek periodika

173

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

1–2

Stát vydavatele periodika

US - Spojené státy americké

Počet stran výsledku

32

Strana od-do

169-200

Kód UT WoS článku

000412988600009

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-85027138863