Gambler’s fallacy and imperfect best response in legislative bargaining

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F67985998%3A_____%2F16%3A00472317" target="_blank" >RIV/67985998:_____/16:00472317 - isvavai.cz</a>

Nalezeny alternativní kódy

RIV/00216208:11640/16:00463349

Výsledek na webu

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.06.008" target="_blank" >http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.06.008</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.06.008" target="_blank" >10.1016/j.geb.2016.06.008</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Gambler’s fallacy and imperfect best response in legislative bargaining

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

We investigate the implications of imperfect best response—in combination with different assumptions about correct (QRE) or incorrect beliefs (Quantal-Gambler's Fallacy or QGF)—in the alternating offer multilateral bargaining game. We prove that a QRE of this game exists and characterize the unique solution to the proposer's problem—that is, the proposal observed most frequently in a QRE. We structurally estimate this model on data from laboratory experiments, and show that it explains behavior better than the model with perfect best response: receivers vote probabilistically; proposers allocate resources mostly within a minimum winning coalition of legislators but do not fully exploit their bargaining power. Incorporating history-dependent beliefs about the future distribution of proposal power into the QRE model (QGF) leads to an even better match with the data, as this model implies slightly lower shares to the proposer, maintaining similar or higher frequencies of minimum winning coalitions and similar voting behavior.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Gambler’s fallacy and imperfect best response in legislative bargaining

Popis výsledku anglicky

We investigate the implications of imperfect best response—in combination with different assumptions about correct (QRE) or incorrect beliefs (Quantal-Gambler's Fallacy or QGF)—in the alternating offer multilateral bargaining game. We prove that a QRE of this game exists and characterize the unique solution to the proposer's problem—that is, the proposal observed most frequently in a QRE. We structurally estimate this model on data from laboratory experiments, and show that it explains behavior better than the model with perfect best response: receivers vote probabilistically; proposers allocate resources mostly within a minimum winning coalition of legislators but do not fully exploit their bargaining power. Incorporating history-dependent beliefs about the future distribution of proposal power into the QRE model (QGF) leads to an even better match with the data, as this model implies slightly lower shares to the proposer, maintaining similar or higher frequencies of minimum winning coalitions and similar voting behavior.

Druh

J_x - Nezařazeno - Článek v odborném periodiku (Jimp, Jsc a Jost)

CEP obor

AH - Ekonomie

OECD FORD obor

—

Projekt

—

Návaznosti

I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Rok uplatnění

2016

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Games and Economic Behavior

ISSN

0899-8256

e-ISSN

—

Svazek periodika

99

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

September

Stát vydavatele periodika

US - Spojené státy americké

Počet stran výsledku

20

Strana od-do

275-294

Kód UT WoS článku

000386194300019

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-84992093316