Manipulating information revelation with reserve prices

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216208%3A11640%2F19%3A00525465" target="_blank" >RIV/00216208:11640/19:00525465 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://doi.org/10.15609/annaeconstat2009.133.0087" target="_blank" >https://doi.org/10.15609/annaeconstat2009.133.0087</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.15609/annaeconstat2009.133.0087" target="_blank" >10.15609/annaeconstat2009.133.0087</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Manipulating information revelation with reserve prices

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

We introduce a novel motive for the use of a reserve price as an instrument to raise auction revenues in ascending auctions. The effect that we stress is of inducing coarser information aggregation. The reserve price may prevent information revelation because bidders cannot precisely observe at which price other bidders leave the auction. In simple settings where valuation functions are not symmetric, this may increase the expected revenue of the auction. To illustrate this motive, we exhibit an example in which the use of a reserve price increases revenue even though there are always at least two bidders active for prices higher than the reserve price.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Manipulating information revelation with reserve prices

Popis výsledku anglicky

We introduce a novel motive for the use of a reserve price as an instrument to raise auction revenues in ascending auctions. The effect that we stress is of inducing coarser information aggregation. The reserve price may prevent information revelation because bidders cannot precisely observe at which price other bidders leave the auction. In simple settings where valuation functions are not symmetric, this may increase the expected revenue of the auction. To illustrate this motive, we exhibit an example in which the use of a reserve price increases revenue even though there are always at least two bidders active for prices higher than the reserve price.

Druh

J_SC - Článek v periodiku v databázi SCOPUS

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

50201 - Economic Theory

Projekt

—

Návaznosti

I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Rok uplatnění

2019

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Annals of Economics and Statistics

ISSN

2115-4430

e-ISSN

—

Svazek periodika

133

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

March

Stát vydavatele periodika

FR - Francouzská republika

Počet stran výsledku

6

Strana od-do

87-91

Kód UT WoS článku

—

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-85085017840