Revenue and efficiency in multi-unit uniform-price auctions

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

RIV/67985998:_____/13:00395840 - isvavai.cz

Výsledek na webu

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.05.007

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

10.1016/j.geb.2013.05.007

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Revenue and efficiency in multi-unit uniform-price auctions

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

This paper analyzes efficiency in a uniform-price multi-unit auction with a positive reservation price. I demonstrate that the reservation price is an important policy tool that may increase efficiency (or welfare) in multi-unit uniform-price auctions. Ishow that the higher the reservation price is,the higher is the seller?s revenue and the higher is the efficiency of a final allocation of units that could be attained in a multi-unit uniform-price auction. The reservation price increases the bidder?s equilibrium strategy in a specific way that is inherent to the uniform-price auction. Thus the reservation price effect on efficiency is in contrast to other auction formats; e.g., the reservation price decreases efficiency in the Vickrey auction and single-unit auctions with symmetric bidders. Therefore the main result can be added to the list of results from mechanism design and auction theory that fail to extend the single-unit/single-dimensional context to the multi-unit/multi-dimensi

Název v anglickém jazyce

Revenue and efficiency in multi-unit uniform-price auctions

Popis výsledku anglicky

This paper analyzes efficiency in a uniform-price multi-unit auction with a positive reservation price. I demonstrate that the reservation price is an important policy tool that may increase efficiency (or welfare) in multi-unit uniform-price auctions. Ishow that the higher the reservation price is,the higher is the seller?s revenue and the higher is the efficiency of a final allocation of units that could be attained in a multi-unit uniform-price auction. The reservation price increases the bidder?s equilibrium strategy in a specific way that is inherent to the uniform-price auction. Thus the reservation price effect on efficiency is in contrast to other auction formats; e.g., the reservation price decreases efficiency in the Vickrey auction and single-unit auctions with symmetric bidders. Therefore the main result can be added to the list of results from mechanism design and auction theory that fail to extend the single-unit/single-dimensional context to the multi-unit/multi-dimensi

Druh

J_x - Nezařazeno - Článek v odborném periodiku (Jimp, Jsc a Jost)

CEP obor

AH - Ekonomie

OECD FORD obor

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Projekt

GAP402/11/1531: Některé aukční finanční trhy v České Republice a dopady úvěrové krize

Návaznosti

I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Rok uplatnění

2013

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Games and Economic Behavior

ISSN

0899-8256

e-ISSN

—

Svazek periodika

82

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

November

Stát vydavatele periodika

US - Spojené státy americké

Počet stran výsledku

13

Strana od-do

205-217

Kód UT WoS článku

000338813500013

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

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