Attentional role of quota implementation

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216208%3A11640%2F21%3A00546178" target="_blank" >RIV/00216208:11640/21:00546178 - isvavai.cz</a>

Nalezeny alternativní kódy

RIV/67985998:_____/21:00546177

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2021.105356" target="_blank" >https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2021.105356</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2021.105356" target="_blank" >10.1016/j.jet.2021.105356</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Attentional role of quota implementation

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

In this paper, we introduce a new role of quotas, e.g. labor market quotas: the attentional role. We study the effect of quota implementation on the attention allocation strategy of a rationally inattentive (RI) manager. We find that quotas induce attention: a RI manager who is forced to fulfill a quota, unlike an unrestricted RI manager, never rejects minority candidates without acquiring information about them. We also demonstrate that in our model quotas are behaviorally equivalent to subsidies. In addition, we analyze different goals that the social planner can achieve by implementing quotas. First, quotas can eliminate statistical discrimination, i.e. make the chances of being hired independent from the group identity. Second, when the hiring manager has inaccurate beliefs about the distribution of candidates' productivities, the social planner can make the manager behave as if she has correct beliefs. Finally, we show how our results can be used to set a quota level that increases the expected value of the chosen candidates.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Attentional role of quota implementation

Popis výsledku anglicky

In this paper, we introduce a new role of quotas, e.g. labor market quotas: the attentional role. We study the effect of quota implementation on the attention allocation strategy of a rationally inattentive (RI) manager. We find that quotas induce attention: a RI manager who is forced to fulfill a quota, unlike an unrestricted RI manager, never rejects minority candidates without acquiring information about them. We also demonstrate that in our model quotas are behaviorally equivalent to subsidies. In addition, we analyze different goals that the social planner can achieve by implementing quotas. First, quotas can eliminate statistical discrimination, i.e. make the chances of being hired independent from the group identity. Second, when the hiring manager has inaccurate beliefs about the distribution of candidates' productivities, the social planner can make the manager behave as if she has correct beliefs. Finally, we show how our results can be used to set a quota level that increases the expected value of the chosen candidates.

Druh

J_imp - Článek v periodiku v databázi Web of Science

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

50201 - Economic Theory

Projekt

—

Návaznosti

I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Rok uplatnění

2021

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Journal of Economic Theory

ISSN

0022-0531

e-ISSN

1095-7235

Svazek periodika

198

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

December

Stát vydavatele periodika

US - Spojené státy americké

Počet stran výsledku

25

Strana od-do

105356

Kód UT WoS článku

000704513600004

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-85115977922