An equivalence between rational inattention problems and complete-information conformity games

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216208%3A11640%2F22%3A00556928" target="_blank" >RIV/00216208:11640/22:00556928 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2022.110444" target="_blank" >https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2022.110444</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2022.110444" target="_blank" >10.1016/j.econlet.2022.110444</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

An equivalence between rational inattention problems and complete-information conformity games

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

We consider two types of models: (i) a rational inattention problem (as known from the literature) and (ii) a conformity game, in which fully informed players find it costly to deviate from average behavior. We show that these problems are equivalent to each other both from the perspective of the participant and the outside observer: Each individual faces identical trade-offs in both situations, and an observer would not be able to distinguish the two models from the choice data they generate. We also establish when individual behavior in the conformity game maximizes welfare.

Název v anglickém jazyce

An equivalence between rational inattention problems and complete-information conformity games

Popis výsledku anglicky

We consider two types of models: (i) a rational inattention problem (as known from the literature) and (ii) a conformity game, in which fully informed players find it costly to deviate from average behavior. We show that these problems are equivalent to each other both from the perspective of the participant and the outside observer: Each individual faces identical trade-offs in both situations, and an observer would not be able to distinguish the two models from the choice data they generate. We also establish when individual behavior in the conformity game maximizes welfare.

Druh

J_imp - Článek v periodiku v databázi Web of Science

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

50202 - Applied Economics, Econometrics

Projekt

—

Návaznosti

S - Specificky vyzkum na vysokych skolach<br>I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Rok uplatnění

2022

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Economics Letters

ISSN

0165-1765

e-ISSN

1873-7374

Svazek periodika

214

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

May

Stát vydavatele periodika

NL - Nizozemsko

Počet stran výsledku

4

Strana od-do

110444

Kód UT WoS článku

000792767000013

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-85127034437