An equivalence between rational inattention problems and complete-information conformity games

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F67985998%3A_____%2F22%3A00557331" target="_blank" >RIV/67985998:_____/22:00557331 - isvavai.cz</a>
Nalezeny alternativní kódy
RIV/00216208:11640/22:00557332
Výsledek na webu
<a href="https://www.cerge-ei.cz/pdf/wp/Wp719.pdf" target="_blank" >https://www.cerge-ei.cz/pdf/wp/Wp719.pdf</a>
DOI - Digital Object Identifier
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Jazyk výsledku
angličtina
Název v původním jazyce
An equivalence between rational inattention problems and complete-information conformity games
Popis výsledku v původním jazyce
We consider two types of models: (i) a rational inattention problem (as known from the literature) and (ii) a conformity game, in which fully informed players find it costly to deviate from average behavior. We show that these problems are equivalent to each other both from the perspective of the participant and the outside observer: Each individual faces identical trade-offs in both situations, and an observer would not be able to distinguish the two models from the choice data they generate. We also establish when individual behavior in the conformity game maximizes welfare.
Název v anglickém jazyce
An equivalence between rational inattention problems and complete-information conformity games
Popis výsledku anglicky
We consider two types of models: (i) a rational inattention problem (as known from the literature) and (ii) a conformity game, in which fully informed players find it costly to deviate from average behavior. We show that these problems are equivalent to each other both from the perspective of the participant and the outside observer: Each individual faces identical trade-offs in both situations, and an observer would not be able to distinguish the two models from the choice data they generate. We also establish when individual behavior in the conformity game maximizes welfare.

Projekt
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Návaznosti
I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Rok uplatnění
2022
Kód důvěrnosti údajů
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

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