Second-chance offers and buyer reputation systems: theory and evidence on auctions with default

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216208%3A11640%2F23%3A00575063" target="_blank" >RIV/00216208:11640/23:00575063 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12448" target="_blank" >https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12448</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12448" target="_blank" >10.1111/1756-2171.12448</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Second-chance offers and buyer reputation systems: theory and evidence on auctions with default

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

Winners in online auctions frequently fail to complete purchases. Major auction platforms therefore allow “second-chance” offers (the runner-up bidder pays his own bid price) and let sellers leave negative feedback on buyers who default. We show theoretically that (i) all else equal, the availability of second-chance offers reduces bids, (ii) sellers have no incentive to exclude bidders, even if they are nearly certain to default, (iii) buyer reputation systems reward bidders known to default with a positive probability. Our experiments show that the economic forces identified in the theoretical model are important enough to have predictive power for bidder behavior.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Second-chance offers and buyer reputation systems: theory and evidence on auctions with default

Popis výsledku anglicky

Winners in online auctions frequently fail to complete purchases. Major auction platforms therefore allow “second-chance” offers (the runner-up bidder pays his own bid price) and let sellers leave negative feedback on buyers who default. We show theoretically that (i) all else equal, the availability of second-chance offers reduces bids, (ii) sellers have no incentive to exclude bidders, even if they are nearly certain to default, (iii) buyer reputation systems reward bidders known to default with a positive probability. Our experiments show that the economic forces identified in the theoretical model are important enough to have predictive power for bidder behavior.

Druh

J_imp - Článek v periodiku v databázi Web of Science

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

50202 - Applied Economics, Econometrics

Projekt

—

Návaznosti

I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Rok uplatnění

2023

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Rand Journal of Economics

ISSN

0741-6261

e-ISSN

1756-2171

Svazek periodika

54

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

3

Stát vydavatele periodika

NL - Nizozemsko

Počet stran výsledku

28

Strana od-do

484-511

Kód UT WoS článku

001049413100001

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-85168266857