Identification of player types in ultimatum bargaining games

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

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Výsledek na webu

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DOI - Digital Object Identifier

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Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Identification of player types in ultimatum bargaining games

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

Using cluster analysis I identified three types of players in two versions of the ultimatum bargaining game (with symmetric and with asymmetric information availability). I call the player types Fair players, Moderate opportunists and Hard-nosed opportunists. The player types constitute 23.1%, 43.3% and 33.6%, respectively, of the sample of 134 experimental participants. The types differ only moderately with respect to their choices in the standard ultimatum game. In particular, Hard-nosed opportunistsmake less generous offers than the two other types. However, there are very pronounced differences in behavior in the asymmetric information game. Fair players make fairer offers, misrepresent the surplus less frequently and to a lesser degree than the two other types. Hard-nosed opportunists are in turn less fair and more deceptive than Moderate opportunists in the asymmetric information game.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Identification of player types in ultimatum bargaining games

Popis výsledku anglicky

Using cluster analysis I identified three types of players in two versions of the ultimatum bargaining game (with symmetric and with asymmetric information availability). I call the player types Fair players, Moderate opportunists and Hard-nosed opportunists. The player types constitute 23.1%, 43.3% and 33.6%, respectively, of the sample of 134 experimental participants. The types differ only moderately with respect to their choices in the standard ultimatum game. In particular, Hard-nosed opportunistsmake less generous offers than the two other types. However, there are very pronounced differences in behavior in the asymmetric information game. Fair players make fairer offers, misrepresent the surplus less frequently and to a lesser degree than the two other types. Hard-nosed opportunists are in turn less fair and more deceptive than Moderate opportunists in the asymmetric information game.

Druh

D - Stať ve sborníku

CEP obor

AN - Psychologie

OECD FORD obor

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Projekt

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Návaznosti

S - Specificky vyzkum na vysokych skolach

Rok uplatnění

2014

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název statě ve sborníku

Conference Proceedings of the 32nd International Conference Mathematical Methods in Economics

ISBN

9788024442099

ISSN

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e-ISSN

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Počet stran výsledku

4

Strana od-do

1074-1077

Název nakladatele

Palacký University

Místo vydání

Olomouc

Místo konání akce

Olomouc

Datum konání akce

1. 1. 2014

Typ akce podle státní příslušnosti

EUR - Evropská akce

Kód UT WoS článku

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