Elicitation of normative and fairness judgments: Do incentives matter?

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216224%3A14560%2F15%3A00083143" target="_blank" >RIV/00216224:14560/15:00083143 - isvavai.cz</a>
Výsledek na webu
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DOI - Digital Object Identifier
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Jazyk výsledku
angličtina
Název v původním jazyce
Elicitation of normative and fairness judgments: Do incentives matter?
Popis výsledku v původním jazyce
Krupka and Weber (2013) introduce an incentive-compatible coordination game as an alternative method for elicitation of normative judgments. I show, however, that people provide virtually the same responses in incentivized and nonincentivized versions ofthe Krupka-Weber game. Besides ratings of social appropriateness, I also elicit ratings of fairness of all possible offers in an ultimatum game. Ratings of social appropriateness and fairness are similar for low offers (below or equal to the equal split), but not for high offers which are judged to be more appropriate than fair.
Název v anglickém jazyce
Elicitation of normative and fairness judgments: Do incentives matter?
Popis výsledku anglicky
Krupka and Weber (2013) introduce an incentive-compatible coordination game as an alternative method for elicitation of normative judgments. I show, however, that people provide virtually the same responses in incentivized and nonincentivized versions ofthe Krupka-Weber game. Besides ratings of social appropriateness, I also elicit ratings of fairness of all possible offers in an ultimatum game. Ratings of social appropriateness and fairness are similar for low offers (below or equal to the equal split), but not for high offers which are judged to be more appropriate than fair.

Druh
J<sub>x</sub> - Nezařazeno - Článek v odborném periodiku (Jimp, Jsc a Jost)
CEP obor
AN - Psychologie
OECD FORD obor
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Rok uplatnění
2015
Kód důvěrnosti údajů
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

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