Based on what should we formulate a legitimate definition of quasi-logical arguments? Case study of arguments of reciprocity

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216224%3A14210%2F16%3A00090769" target="_blank" >RIV/00216224:14210/16:00090769 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://poznanreasoningweek.wordpress.com/" target="_blank" >https://poznanreasoningweek.wordpress.com/</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

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Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Based on what should we formulate a legitimate definition of quasi-logical arguments? Case study of arguments of reciprocity

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

The paper attempts to formulate an explicit definition of the so-called quasi-logical arguments, the phenomenon originally defined by Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca in the new rhetoric. The new rhetoric is widely criticized as a model that provides a vague definition of its categories leading to possible different understanding categories and subsequently to different results when the categories are used in the analysis. The paper offers a case study of a particular subtype of quasi-logical arguments, so-called arguments of reciprocity.The paper is divided into two parts. The first part analyzes the sources of vagueness allowing different interpretations. The difference of interpretations is demonstrated by the analysis of three recent attempts to define arguments of reciprocity explicitly. The difference of interpretations raises the question of legitimacy of these interpretations given to the elements of the original category of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Based on what should we formulate a legitimate definition of quasi-logical arguments? Case study of arguments of reciprocity

Popis výsledku anglicky

The paper attempts to formulate an explicit definition of the so-called quasi-logical arguments, the phenomenon originally defined by Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca in the new rhetoric. The new rhetoric is widely criticized as a model that provides a vague definition of its categories leading to possible different understanding categories and subsequently to different results when the categories are used in the analysis. The paper offers a case study of a particular subtype of quasi-logical arguments, so-called arguments of reciprocity.The paper is divided into two parts. The first part analyzes the sources of vagueness allowing different interpretations. The difference of interpretations is demonstrated by the analysis of three recent attempts to define arguments of reciprocity explicitly. The difference of interpretations raises the question of legitimacy of these interpretations given to the elements of the original category of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca.

Druh

O - Ostatní výsledky

CEP obor

AA - Filosofie a náboženství

OECD FORD obor

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Projekt

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Návaznosti

S - Specificky vyzkum na vysokych skolach

Rok uplatnění

2016

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů