Augean Intuitive Stables: Definition of Moral Intuition
Identifikátory výsledku
Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216224%3A14210%2F16%3A00091199" target="_blank" >RIV/00216224:14210/16:00091199 - isvavai.cz</a>
Výsledek na webu
<a href="http://espp16.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/" target="_blank" >http://espp16.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/</a>
DOI - Digital Object Identifier
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Alternativní jazyky
Jazyk výsledku
angličtina
Název v původním jazyce
Augean Intuitive Stables: Definition of Moral Intuition
Popis výsledku v původním jazyce
Over the last 15 years, the term moral intuition has become prominent in empirically oriented study of morality. It’s one of the central concepts in moral psychology and empirically minded moral philosophy. However, its meaning is far from being clear – various researchers use it in various ways. The unfortunate consequence of this is a conceptual mess rivaling the proverbial Augean stables. The primary aim of this paper is to clarify this conceptual confusion through thinking carefully about what we really want from a good definition of moral intuition – i.e. to which questions we expect it to provide answers. The hope is that through this we can gain some clarity on what we are dealing with when we talk about moral intuitions. The secondary aim is to show through this analysis in what ways can a philosopher be useful for the project of empirical study of morality without need to get his hands dirty with data collection.
Název v anglickém jazyce
Augean Intuitive Stables: Definition of Moral Intuition
Popis výsledku anglicky
Over the last 15 years, the term moral intuition has become prominent in empirically oriented study of morality. It’s one of the central concepts in moral psychology and empirically minded moral philosophy. However, its meaning is far from being clear – various researchers use it in various ways. The unfortunate consequence of this is a conceptual mess rivaling the proverbial Augean stables. The primary aim of this paper is to clarify this conceptual confusion through thinking carefully about what we really want from a good definition of moral intuition – i.e. to which questions we expect it to provide answers. The hope is that through this we can gain some clarity on what we are dealing with when we talk about moral intuitions. The secondary aim is to show through this analysis in what ways can a philosopher be useful for the project of empirical study of morality without need to get his hands dirty with data collection.
Klasifikace
Druh
O - Ostatní výsledky
CEP obor
AA - Filosofie a náboženství
OECD FORD obor
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Návaznosti výsledku
Projekt
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Návaznosti
S - Specificky vyzkum na vysokych skolach
Ostatní
Rok uplatnění
2016
Kód důvěrnosti údajů
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů