It Ought To Be Therefore It Is: On Fallaciousness of So-Called Moralistic Fallacy

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216224%3A14210%2F17%3A00097098" target="_blank" >RIV/00216224:14210/17:00097098 - isvavai.cz</a>
Výsledek na webu
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Jazyk výsledku
angličtina
Název v původním jazyce
It Ought To Be Therefore It Is: On Fallaciousness of So-Called Moralistic Fallacy
Popis výsledku v původním jazyce
The problem of moralistic fallacy, crossing the gap from ought-propositions to is-propositions, is considered with regard to four questions: Should we consider all ought-propositions (or is-propositions) in same manner? Is the ought-is move an inference or is it just a case of some practical assumption? Is this move fallacious in any discussion? To address these questions we use the pragma-dialectical theory, where ought-is relation argumentatively as relation between propositions in reason and standpoint.
Název v anglickém jazyce
It Ought To Be Therefore It Is: On Fallaciousness of So-Called Moralistic Fallacy
Popis výsledku anglicky
The problem of moralistic fallacy, crossing the gap from ought-propositions to is-propositions, is considered with regard to four questions: Should we consider all ought-propositions (or is-propositions) in same manner? Is the ought-is move an inference or is it just a case of some practical assumption? Is this move fallacious in any discussion? To address these questions we use the pragma-dialectical theory, where ought-is relation argumentatively as relation between propositions in reason and standpoint.

Rok uplatnění
2017
Kód důvěrnosti údajů
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

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