Examples and Paradigms

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

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Výsledek na webu

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DOI - Digital Object Identifier

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Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Examples and Paradigms

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

The distinction between an example and a paradigm has been neglected. This confusion probably began with the translation of "parádeigma" into Latin as “exemplum”. I argue that it is reasonable to distinguish between examples and paradigms as follows: An example is a member of a class so conveniently chosen that it shows, i.e. exemplifies the characteristic properties of all members of the class. A paradigm is an object, some of whose properties define a class so that another object belongs to this class if and only if it is the same as the paradigm with respect to the defining properties of the paradigm (there being a method of comparison). A paradigm precedes a class; whereas an example follows a class. If a paradigm of X changes, the class X changes with it (this means that X is not a rigid designator). If an example of X changes, it may cease to be an example of X. In contrast to examples, paradigms do have a normative dimension. Furthermore, I argue that neglecting this distinction has led to several philosophical problems, paradoxes and specious fallacies. Thus Geach (1966) came up with his Socratic fallacy: it is not possible to arrive at a definition of T by giving examples of T. This would be possible however if Socrates were seeking for the paradigm of T instead of an example of T. Confusing the use of paradigms and examples is wide-spread in contemporary debates. The term “paradigm” is central to Kuhn’s (1962) account of scientific revolutions. Since the second edition, however, he has preferred the term “exemplar” instead (1994, p.187). Agamben (1993, chap. Example; 1998) equates the notions of example and paradigm (along with other terms such as “exemplar” or “Beispiel”). Even his central notion of homo sacer is initially an exemplar of the relation of simultaneous inclusion and exclusion. Later, however, he managed to prefer “paradigm” and to indicate the distinction between a paradigm and an example (Agamben 2009).

Název v anglickém jazyce

Examples and Paradigms

Popis výsledku anglicky

The distinction between an example and a paradigm has been neglected. This confusion probably began with the translation of "parádeigma" into Latin as “exemplum”. I argue that it is reasonable to distinguish between examples and paradigms as follows: An example is a member of a class so conveniently chosen that it shows, i.e. exemplifies the characteristic properties of all members of the class. A paradigm is an object, some of whose properties define a class so that another object belongs to this class if and only if it is the same as the paradigm with respect to the defining properties of the paradigm (there being a method of comparison). A paradigm precedes a class; whereas an example follows a class. If a paradigm of X changes, the class X changes with it (this means that X is not a rigid designator). If an example of X changes, it may cease to be an example of X. In contrast to examples, paradigms do have a normative dimension. Furthermore, I argue that neglecting this distinction has led to several philosophical problems, paradoxes and specious fallacies. Thus Geach (1966) came up with his Socratic fallacy: it is not possible to arrive at a definition of T by giving examples of T. This would be possible however if Socrates were seeking for the paradigm of T instead of an example of T. Confusing the use of paradigms and examples is wide-spread in contemporary debates. The term “paradigm” is central to Kuhn’s (1962) account of scientific revolutions. Since the second edition, however, he has preferred the term “exemplar” instead (1994, p.187). Agamben (1993, chap. Example; 1998) equates the notions of example and paradigm (along with other terms such as “exemplar” or “Beispiel”). Even his central notion of homo sacer is initially an exemplar of the relation of simultaneous inclusion and exclusion. Later, however, he managed to prefer “paradigm” and to indicate the distinction between a paradigm and an example (Agamben 2009).

Druh

O - Ostatní výsledky

CEP obor

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OECD FORD obor

60300 - Philosophy, Ethics and Religion

Projekt

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Návaznosti

S - Specificky vyzkum na vysokych skolach

Rok uplatnění

2017

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů