Should we use legitimate fallacies? A case study of whataboutism in the discourse on the Russian-Ukrainian war

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216275%3A25210%2F24%3A39921552" target="_blank" >RIV/00216275:25210/24:39921552 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/citedby/10.1080/10511431.2024.2403273?scroll=top&needAccess=true" target="_blank" >https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/citedby/10.1080/10511431.2024.2403273?scroll=top&needAccess=true</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10511431.2024.2403273" target="_blank" >10.1080/10511431.2024.2403273</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Should we use legitimate fallacies? A case study of whataboutism in the discourse on the Russian-Ukrainian war

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

Although the use of argumentative fallacies is generally prohibited in discourse, a significant part of fallacy studies consists in identifying the specific circumstances where the use of a fallacy is permissible. However, this literature often remains silent on whether a fallacy should be used even when deemed legitimate. This silence is problematic, as it suggests that the legitimacy is the sole criterion for deploying a fallacy. In this paper, I challenge this approach by demonstrating that even when a fallacy is legitimate, its use could still jeopardize the arguer’s goals. I base this argument on an analysis of a specific instance of the whataboutism fallacy used by Noam Chomsky in his commentary on the Russian invasion of Ukraine. I show that Chomsky’s references to the United States’ actions in Afghanistan and Iraq are better understood as broadening the context of the discussion rather than distracting or even justifying Russian actions. This is what makes Chomsky’s whataboutisms plausibly legitimate. But while these whataboutisms might be legitimate, I argue, drawing on a cost-benefit analysis of decision to argue framework, that Chomsky has compelling reasons to avoid using them. Real-life examples show that such arguments are prone to misunderstanding and misuse. I conclude that the risks associated with Chomsky’s whataboutism outweigh the potential benefits, suggesting that he should avoid their deployment. This case study reveals a broader lesson for the fallacy literature: it must explicitly address whether the legitimacy of a fallacy is sufficient justification for its use.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Should we use legitimate fallacies? A case study of whataboutism in the discourse on the Russian-Ukrainian war

Popis výsledku anglicky

Although the use of argumentative fallacies is generally prohibited in discourse, a significant part of fallacy studies consists in identifying the specific circumstances where the use of a fallacy is permissible. However, this literature often remains silent on whether a fallacy should be used even when deemed legitimate. This silence is problematic, as it suggests that the legitimacy is the sole criterion for deploying a fallacy. In this paper, I challenge this approach by demonstrating that even when a fallacy is legitimate, its use could still jeopardize the arguer’s goals. I base this argument on an analysis of a specific instance of the whataboutism fallacy used by Noam Chomsky in his commentary on the Russian invasion of Ukraine. I show that Chomsky’s references to the United States’ actions in Afghanistan and Iraq are better understood as broadening the context of the discussion rather than distracting or even justifying Russian actions. This is what makes Chomsky’s whataboutisms plausibly legitimate. But while these whataboutisms might be legitimate, I argue, drawing on a cost-benefit analysis of decision to argue framework, that Chomsky has compelling reasons to avoid using them. Real-life examples show that such arguments are prone to misunderstanding and misuse. I conclude that the risks associated with Chomsky’s whataboutism outweigh the potential benefits, suggesting that he should avoid their deployment. This case study reveals a broader lesson for the fallacy literature: it must explicitly address whether the legitimacy of a fallacy is sufficient justification for its use.

Druh

J_imp - Článek v periodiku v databázi Web of Science

CEP obor

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OECD FORD obor

60302 - Ethics (except ethics related to specific subfields)

Projekt

—

Návaznosti

S - Specificky vyzkum na vysokych skolach

Rok uplatnění

2024

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Argumentation and Advocacy

ISSN

1051-1431

e-ISSN

2576-8476

Svazek periodika

Neuveden

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

11. září 2024

Stát vydavatele periodika

GB - Spojené království Velké Británie a Severního Irska

Počet stran výsledku

16

Strana od-do

1-16

Kód UT WoS článku

001310445000001

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

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